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With the rapidly growing recognition that information is
a resource, increasing emphasis has been placed on its
proper management. As the technical expert in matters
relating to Automated Data Processing (ADP) , the Naval Data
Automation Command (NAVDAC) and its regionalized satellites
play an important rcle in Information Resource Management
(IRM) . With the proliferation of office automation equip-
ment, the principal focus has been to tie together the
various computers both within an office and between offices
via some form of communications. Consequently, another
"player", Naval Telecommunications Command (NAVTELCCM)
becomes involved. Although the interdependency between ADP
and telecommunications is evident from a functional stand-
point, the two principals seem to lack a coordinated effort
to resolve some of the key management issues resulting from
the converging technologies.
The ADP environment is governed by Life Cycle Management
(LCM) . LCM embraces the strengthening of early decisions
which shape the costs and utility of an Automated
Information System (AIS) . These early decisions encompass
full consideration of functional, ADP, and telecommu nica-
tions requirements to produce an effective AIS. Further, the
ICM process seeks to achieve certain objectives including:
1. to assure management accountability for the success
or failure of AIS developments and to identify the
rcle and responsibility of functional, telecommunica-
tions, and ADP managers throughout the life cycle of
an AIS;
2. tc establish a control mechanism to assure that an
AIS is developed, evaluated, and operated in an
effective manner at the lowest total overall cost;
3- tc provide visibility for all resource requirements
of an AIS; and
4. to promote cost effective standardization of an AIS
for use throughout the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the Department of the Navy (DON). [Ref. 1: pp.
35-55]
Within the context of Navy Industrial Funding (NIF)
,
NAVDAC's organization is placed fundamentally in a "seller-
buyer" relationship with its clients. As a "business enter-
prise," NAVDAC must therefore be responsive to the most
current needs of its customers. With this knowledge, the
issue reduces to one of selecting the "right" services in
the right amount to provide to regionalized customers. As
might fce expected, there are many complications which
exacerbate the development of a simple and straightforward
solution including:
1. NIF requirements for stabilized rates;
2. how to forecast or predict customer requirements so
as to keep pace with technology and demand;
3. at what level should internal management control be
implemented;
4. the differences in the management environments of the
two principals with respect to policies, procedures,
etc. ; and
5. the attendant impact on the level of services.
Telecommunications requirements in support of ADP are
submitted by the requiring activity or submitting authority.
There are several differences between ADP and telecommunica-
tions support regarding to policy, levels of requirements,
dollar/approval thresholds, procedures/schedules for submit-
ting plans, submitting authority, validation authority, and
approval authority. A good explanation of these variances
and a comparison of the differences is contained in IT A.
Sheedy's thesis on the Acquisition Of Telecommunications In
The Navx From An Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Point Of
View [Ref. 1 ].
B. OEJECT OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this research is to review and evaluate
the role of NAVDAC and its satellites in providing technical
advice and support for data communications from the stand-
point of Information Resource Management. Inasmuch as IRM
entails a wide range of applications, this research will
provide only a broad overview of IRM within the context of
NAVDAC's role as technical expert on ADP matters. The
primary focus will be on who should provide long haul data
communications service to its Navy customers and through
what means. If pertinent, the research will also address how
and where the Navy Regionalized Data Centers (NARDACs) and
the Navy Automated Data Facilities (NAVDAFs) as the repre-
sentatives of NAVDAC should provide data communications
services to its local customers. These are the principal
research guestions as well. The study also seeks to find the
answers to related guestions such as: "Is NAVDAC the appro-
priate instrument for effecting telecommunications for
ADP?"; "What services/support is needed or desired by Navy
customers?"; "Should NARDACs supply complete ("cradle to
grave") support for users or merely technical assistance as
reguested?"
C. HETHCDOIOGY
Fundamentally, the methodology employed will be to
develop a framework of thinking for NAVDAC to deal with
essential decision problems. This framework will employ the
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IRM concept and will seek to provide insight into various
decision problems in a continually changing and turbulent
environment within the unique constraints imposed by Navy
and DOD policies. In particular, decision problems of
interest pertain to what services NAVDAC should provide and
how it should provide them. In order to permit a meaningful
study, primary emphasis will be placed on data communication
services.
D. OEGAHIZATION
The organization of this thesis reflects the authors'
view of the factors essential to formulating meaningful
conclusions and useful recommendations regarding the role
NAVDAC must assume in the data communications arena. Because
the thesis revolves around economic IRM concepts, a generic
framework for IRM is first developed. To establish that the
relationship of NAVIAC and its satellites to customers is
fundamentally no different than that which exists between
businesses in the private sector and information systems
suppliers, Chapter III provides a background of
NAVDAC/NSRDACs within the NIF environment. In a general
sense, Chapter IV outlines why computers are linked, what
the linked computers can offer, and how to link computers
together. Chapter V then provides the scope of the ADP/data
communications issue and includes a discussion of data
communications costs. Further, the internal procedures
within the Navy for acquiring the needed services are
outlined. In Chapter VI the essential ADP/data communica-
tions management issues are presented. Chapter VII then
provides an analysis of the issues presented to that point
and offers recommendations. The final chapter summarizes and
concludes the thesis.
11
II. GENERIC IRM IRAME.IQB.K DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
One indication of the trend towards Information Resource
Management (IRM) can be found in the recently promulgated
Department of Defense Instruction DOD INST 7740.1 dated 20
June 19E3. The instruction sets forth the Defense
Department's position in regards to the IRM program. In the
instruction IRM is defined as:
The policy/ action, or procedure concerning information
(both automated and non-automated) that management
establishes to serve the overall current and future
needs of the organization. IRM policy and procedures
would address such areas as availabili ty, timeliness,
accuracy, integrity, privacy, security, auditability
,
ownership, use, ana cost-effectiveness of information.
Although the DOD definition of IRM appears to be somewhat
vague, general, or a "pie in the sky" description, the
authors will not attempt to defend or argue over its appli-
cability. Rather, a different approach will be employed. To
make the IRM framework development more meaningful and
easier to understand, the generic IRM system will be
described intentionally at a low organizational level. The
notions of transfer pricing; incentives, rewards, and penal-
ties; and other management control ideas described in the
following sections are equally as applicable at a higher or
organization-wide level.
The first section will seek to frame the IRM system in a
very general way by describing the IRM system within an
organizational entity. Notions of profit are scattered
throughout this section but the ideas can be applied to
non-profit activities by comparing profit incentives with
12
cost-avoidance ones. Inasmuch as the procedures for
"thinking through" various decision problems from the
supplier side are very similar in nature, the next section
focuses only on the capacity choice decision problem.
Throughout this section the reader must keep in mind that
ether decision problems (e.g., product mix) can be thought
out in a very similar fashion. The final section concen-
trates en the user or customer side and provides some
insight into the user's perspective in seeking services from
suppliers. Caution must be interjected at this point since
the following sections are founded on and heavily influenced
by economic theories. Readers with marginal understanding of
microeconomic concepts may wish to first review this subject
as this chapter was written under the assumption that
readers would have this fundamental knowledge.
B. HCW TO THINK ABODT AN IBM SYSTEM
Fundamental to thinking about an IRM system is an under-
standing of
1. its organizational structure and the associated
structure of incentives, rewards, and penalties;
2. its decentralized planning, coordination, and control
process;
3. the decisionmaking behavior of each of the system
components with regard to such issues as capacity,
technology, and product mix; and
4. the Central Management's unique role as system
manager and coordinator with the organization's other
activities so as to decide how much information is
enough.
Viewed as an interrelated set of system components managed
by a system management procedure, an IRM system can be
illustrated by assuming a routinized organization. Its
13
structure, the principal decision problems confronting indi-
vidual system components, the basic incentive, reward, and
penalty structure for system components, and the vertical
flow cf data are all graphically displayed in Figure 2.
1
Moreover, the organization's interface with external markets
is depicted. The separate system components are organiza-
tional entities responsible for specified function (s) which
contribute to the entire system. The set of incentives,
rewards, and penalties along with communication channels
between the components and Central Management (as well as
among the system components, though not depicted in the
figure) and Central Management's controls, combine to make
up the system management procedure.
The procedure implied in Figure 2. 1 is a decentralized
one. Each manager/user is sent communications relevant only
to the user's particular component and is allowed tc employ
local management discretion to attain efficiency and effec-
tiveness within the manager's sphere of responsibility.
Reciprocally, messages concerning the details of the
specific technologies employed or the input markets local to
a system component are not reguired by Central Management.
Most significantly, Central Management strives to attain a
level of equilibrium (between information supply and
demand) . By selecting a combination of transfer price,
product, and budget level, Central Management can manipulate
the behavior of the individual components in the aggregrate,
i.e., the systemic behavior. As each individual manager
formulates and solves his respective decision problem,
Central Management may select a new combination of inputs to
the system components with the goal of progressing to an
equilibrium point. In short, this is an iterative process.
Figures 2.2 to 2.4 together with Figure 2.1 will provide
keener insight into the decisionmaking behavior of the indi-
vidual system components. In the most general sense, the
14
manager of each organizational entity responds to certain
stimuli from both inside and outside the organization, in
order to satisfy the decision problem based on the most
currently available data. In many instances, the component
manager has no control or influence on parameters which
affect the decision problem itself. As a specific example,
the manager of the Software Development and Maintenance
unit, a cost center, is confronted with a technology and
software product constrained minimize life cycle cost deci-
sion problem. The decision variables are the levels for each
input and mix of the inputs. In essence, it is the produc-
tion planning of capacity and technology. Transfer prices
set by Central Management and market price of labor are
outside the component manager's sphere of control.
Therefore, the software manager selects technology and
capacity so as to minimize life cycle production costs. In
like fashion, the managers of the other organizational units
behave according to their applicable set of parameters and
inputs in their respective decisionmaking process.
Figure 2.5 provides in graphic form the role of Central
Management as the system manager. Central Management's
subjective choice of transfer prices, software products
reguirements and schedule, and user's information budget, is
precipitated by the demand and supply for each product,
computer service or computer capacity. Most uniguely,
Central Management also provides qualitative guidance on the
direction of the organization, a vision of where the organi-
zation is headed in the future, as well as subjective evalu-
ation of system component managers. Ultimately, Central
Management's subjective preference of a specific combination
of transfer prices, tudgets, and software products serve to
resolve the issue cf "how much information is worth the







































































































































Figure 2.1 IBM Structure
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Figure 2-5 Central Management Eole.
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C. HCfl TO FRAMf THE CAPACITY CHOICE PROBLEM AND SEARCH FOR
ITS SOLUTION GIVEN THE STRUCTURE OF A PROFIT CENTER
To facilitate th€ reader's understanding of the capacity
choice problem, it is necessary to abstract to a level above
the system component level and view the IRM System as a
single entity with resources as inputs and information as
outputs. Applying the concept cf incentives, rewards, and
penalties, this single entity can be structured as a profit
center. Further, the technology available for creating,
storing, and providing information provides the relation-
ships between resources and information. To further
simplify the scenario, the following asssuraptions are made:
1. Pure and perfect competition exists - pure and
perfect competition occurs when the market is in such
a state as to render the individual actions cf either
the buyer or the seller insignificant in relation to
the overall market. Further, the underlying assump-
tion is that complete information regarding market
prices and guantities are available to all concerned.
2. Future resource prices and transfer prices for infor-
mation are identical to current prices.
3. Decisionmaking focuses only on scale - one input (or
resource usage need) yields one output (or product
need)
.
Accordingly, the choice of a maximum profit production plan
reduces to the consideration of possible alternative general
characteristics of technology related to scale with further
examination of the profit maximizing scale of operations. In
reality, the profit maximizing decision includes capacity
choice, as well as the choice of resource mix, technology
choice, and product mix. Specifically, the interrelatedness
of these issues requires resolution concurrently. For the




Fundamentally, the emphasis is placed on technology and
how it can generate the desired information. With this in
mind, there are four steps in exploring technology charac-
teristics. In order from simplest to most complex, they are:
1. constant returns to a variable input;
2. decreasing returns to a variable resource;
3. increasing returns to a variable resource; and
4. stages of production which incorporate steps (2) and
(3).
Returning to the central issue, i.e., the profit maximizing
capacity, it is apparent that the profit function must be
incorporated in some way. Before proceeding further,
however, it would be fruitful to briefly discuss the
concepts of discounting or present valuation. With the
knowledge that interest rates (opportunity to earn addi-
tional money) and inflation rates affect the real value of
money over time, managerial decisionmaking must take into
account the value of time. Accordingly, discount factors (or
interest rates depending on the perspective) are applied to
calculate this time value. Without entering into a detailed
discussion, the present value, Pv, of a single amount, F,
payable in lump sum, n years from now and assuming an
interest rate of r, can be computed as follows:
Fv = F/(1+r)**n
With this basic understanding of the concept of discount
factors for present life valuation, and omitting the mathe-
matical derivation, the decision problem can be stated alge-
braically as
MAX {Sum (t = 0,T) (1/ (1 +r) ** t) } * (g*I - Pr*R)
fcy choice of I, R




t = any period cf time from to T
T = organization planning horizon
r = discount factor (cost of capital)
q = transfer price of information
I = information
PR = market price of the resource
E = resource
Ey rearranging this equation, profit can be measured in
units cf information (i.e., divide by life cycle costs of
information) and an economic tradeoff of resource and infor-
mation is also generated (slope) . Because of the assumption
treating future prices identical to current prices,
discounting aspects cancel out and maximizing profit in the
present will account for the maximum profit in each of the
succeeding planning years and over the life cycle.
Recognizing the new equation is of the form Y= t + aX,
isoprofit lines can he plotted on the same graph as the
Total Productivity Curve (TPC) . The slope of the isoprofit
line is, again, the external economic tradeoff. The profit
maximizing production plan occurs when Marginal Physical
Productivity (MPP) equals the resource/information relative
price. Graphically, this is the slope of the isoprofit
lines. This occurs in the decreasing returns stage. In
effect, this process can be described as matching the organ-
ization to the environment. Conceptually, the path repre-
sented by the TPC is "transited" with various stops along
the way to check the value cf the tradeoffs. If a higher
rate can be achieved internally, (as opposed to externally)
then continue to conceptually transit the TPC path until
internal tradeoffs match the external tradeoffs (or it is
passed, then back up). Of course, there exist other orienta-
tions to reaching this profit maximizing point. From the
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"input view", the operative question is "how iruch mere
information will be generated by an additional unit of
input?" Stated another way, "is incremental revenue greater
than ircremental cost?" If so, proceed along the conceptual
path (TPC) until Marginal Revenue equals Marginal Cost. The
"output orientation" considers cost. Again proceed along the
TPC as long as incremental costs are less than the incre-
mental revenue until the Marginal Profit equals zero, i.e.
Marginal Revenue minus Marginal Cost equals zero.
Irrespective of the method of search, the same point is
reached.
A compelling argument can be made for employing what is
known as the Manager's Cost Function. This relates the cost
of producing information to the quantity of information
produced. Employing this perspective yields the minimum cost
to produce a given level of output. A decision based on the
Cost Function implies a choice of technology since it is
shaped by technology and the resource price. The concepts of
Marginal, Average and Total Costs can be applied to evalu-
ating the Cost Function. A word of caution must be inter-
jected here since costs are meaningful only in the context
of the decision problem. In other words, what is fixed in
one decision problem may be variable in another. With fixed
costs. Marginal Cost remains unaffected but the Average Cost
Curve is raised at every output level. Employing the Cost
Function in searching for the optimum level of output
entails finding the point on the Cost curve where Marginal
Profit is zero.
In summary, there are various methods available for
seeking the solution to the capacity choice problem. In
general, the methods utilize incremental values, other
things being equal. Whichever method is selected, the
results will be identical.
24
E. USERS' PERSPECTIVE OF IBM
1 . Aspects of C ost
The requestor ( also referred to as the user in this
section) must examine the cost versus the benefits of the
service cr product being considered. In most cases the total
benefit to be derived and the total cost to obtain the
benefit are a combination of the obvious and the not so
obvious. Depending en the service or product, the benefits
may be guantifiable cr more qualitative in nature. They
could be measured in terms of a new machine which produces
more units per hour or the benefit may be something harder
to quantify such as high morale or better communication
between personnel. The cost as well may be easily measurable
or more subtle. The cost may be as obvious as a price tag on
a machine or more subtle, such as the cost of opportunities
forgone.
A simplistic example may illustrate these factors of
cost to a requester. A father wants a bicycle for his son.
He (the requester) gees to a store (the supplier) to inquire
about the price of a boy's bicycle ( product/service). The
cost he is told is $110. The father at this point is faced
with his first decision among three basic alternatives: buy
the bicycle from the supplier; build the bicyle himself; or
not get the bicycle, as the price seems higher than the
prospective benefit. After some reflection he decides that
he can huild the bicycle himself at less than the price
guoted by the supplier. The father prices the piping, chain,
sprockets, etc. and finds that the material cost is $60. He
therefore decides that the cost ($60) of providing the
product himself ("in-house") is (a) less than the cost of
aquiring it from the supplier and (b) less than or equal to
the benefit (ie. family/emotional well being) to he derived
from obtaining the prcduct/service.
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But, there are additional costs that must be consid-
ered. The father must cut and shape the pipe into the
appropriate pieces. Now to purchase the machines to accom-
plish this would end the project right there as the addi-
tional cost would be prohibitive. In this example however,
the father finds a business that will do the shaping and
cutting - for a price. The father takes his plans and pipe
to the company and the deed is done, at a cost of $20. Now
he simply returns home, assembles the parts, and he has a
bike for a material and shaping cost of $90. Therefore, he
has produced a bicycle (product/service) for a cost of $90
(in-house) as compared to the $110 that would have been
charged by the supplier.
In the example above the father saved $30, or did
he? There are also the cost of opportunities forgone. There
are usually two aspects to a person or organization
producing a product or service from within - time and money.
Each of these areas has its own considerations. There is
the simple, countable aspect of the money p'aid to the
provider of the items or services used in the in-house
production of a product. Also, as a rule, the airount of
money available to an organization is not unlimited. If
money is spent on one item or service it is then not avail-
able to be spent on a different item or service. In the
example of the father, the money spent on the bicycle was no
longer available to be spent on another item, a new calcu-
lator for instance. Perhaps the father in the example was a
tax consultant and the new calculator would have allowed him
to provide faster and more reliable service to his clients.
This improved capability may have enhanced his ability to
hold present clients and to interest potential ones. These
customers generate revenues, but since he elected to spend
the money on the construction of the bicycle vice the calcu-
lator, this potential increased revenue is lost. That
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opportunity forgone ( $ ) is really an additional cost of
the decision to provide the bicycle in-house.
lime is usually another aspect of cost. If a company
either hires or utilizes personnel already in the employ of
the company to provide a product or service that cost may be
calculated as the sum of XS/hr times the hours spent by each
employee on providing the product or service. However, that
sum may not encompass the total cost. Returning to the
example, the father spent an hour going to the supplier to
get a price, two hours drawing up his own assembly plans, an
hour getting the materials, an hour waiting for the pipe to
be cut and shaped and two hours actually assembling the
bicycle. Had he decided to purchase the bicycle from the
supplier, the majority of that time could have been spent
doing tax work which would have generated income. If he
normally charges $20/hr for his time, then the additional
time spent providing the product in-house has a cost associ-
ated with it that can be calculated. That cost of opportu-
nity (revenues) forgone then becomes another factor in the
cost of the decision to produce the product in-house.
At this point it is time to add up and compare the
cost to the father of obtaining the product (bicycle) from
the supplier versus providing it in-house. To purchase from
the supplier the cost would have included:
1. $110 cost of product
2. + $20 ($20/hr x 1hr) cost of time
3.
4. $130 total cost
The cost to obtain the product/service in-house includes:
1
. $60 parts
2- $20 bending and shaping
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3. $160 ($20/hr x 8hrs) cost of time
4<
5. $240 total cost
So what appeared at first to be a savings of $30 by
providing the product in-house was in reality a loss of 3110
as compared to purchasing the same product/service from the
supplier.
The point of this section is, of course, not whether
one should purchase cr build a bicycle. The point is that
when a company is comparing the benefits of a product or
service to the cost of alternative means of obtaining the
product/service, many not so obvious factors must be
included in the cost calculation.
2- Initial Considerations for a New Service
It seems that there should be a logical process to
be followed in making such decisions as obtaining a new
service or product or in evaluating current products/
services. For a company being offered a new service there is
a series of questions or evaluations that would seem perti-
nent to the decision. First, does the service hold potential
benefit for the potential buyer? At first this may seem to
be a superflous guestion. After all, products or services
must have a benefit associated with them or they would not
be in the market place. The guestion here, however, is
whether the product or service in guestion provides poten-
tial benefits to the specific company and that company's
function and goals. The answer must start with a clear
understanding at the user and management levels of exactly
what those functions and goals are.
If the answer to the guestion above is yes, then the
second question becomes pertinent. "What is the value of the
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potential benefit to the company?" This is not an easy ques-
tion to answer and contains in itself room for considerable
evaluation. The strictly numerical benefit is of secondary
importance at this point tc the question of relative
benefit. It is not often that an organization finds itself
in a situation of having "spare" money (money that if not
spent on the service/product in question would not be put
toward ether products, services, or in some other manner
used to derive a benefit) to spend on a new product or
service. In that mest unusual case the decision is simply
one of determining if the expected benefit is of more value
that the monetary cost of obtaining that new product/
service. More often it is a question of the value of the
benefit of the new service relative to that of products/
services on which funds are already being spent. Thus, the
decisicn to spend a portion of the organization's funds or
resources should also include a review and ranking of the
benefits of those products/services on which funds are
already being spent. Cnce this is accomplished, the expected
benefits of the potential product/service can be compared on
a relative basis tc the present products/services and
ranked accordingly. This is an important prerequisite to the
next step.
3- The In- house Vs. Buy_ Decision
Once the decision is made that the potential
product/service is of benefit to the particular organization
and its benefit relative to present services has been deter-
mined, the next aspect to be evaluated is cost. A series of
questions is applicable at this point. "Can the potential
service be provided by "in-house" expertise?" If the answer
is "no" then the cost evaluation becomes one of taking the
least cost among competitors who offer equivalent services.
If the answer to the question is "yes", then the natural
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follow ce question is, "At what cost to the organization can
the service be provided "in-house" ?". This costing out
process must then include, as demonstrated by the bicycle
example, both "direct" and the "substitute" cost. The direct
cost in this case is the cost of any new material required
plus the salary of individuals assigned to providing the
service. The substitute costs are the costs of lost
benefits/revenues that they would normally be producing if
they were still assigned to their normal endeavors.
There may be room for some argument as to whether or
not the salaries of those people assigned should be included
in the cost of providing the new service since the organiza-
tion was already paying them- The fact that they were paid
previously and would still be paid to perform their normal
functions had they not been assigned to provide the new
service really pertains to the cost of providing that
previous service. Cnce their efforts are applied to
providing the new service then the cost of their salaries
becomes a part of the total cost of providing that new
service.
Once the cost of producing the new service
"in-house" has been determined, the cost of "in-hcuse"
versus market cost can be compared and a least cost to the
organization of obtaining the new service can be determined.
**• Deletion vs. Reduction Methods of Expend itur e
Adjustment
At this point the organization knows the cost of the
potential service and its benefit value relative to ether
services for which funds are being expended. It can also be
assumed known what total revenue is available to be expended
or in a phrase the "budget constraint". In general the cost
of services to be considered here fall into one of two
categories - analysis cost or systems cost. Analysis cost
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is the cost of a service which is a one time cost and may or
may not lead to charges in the organization or its way of
doing business. The funds paid to a consulting firm is a
good example of analysis cost. The firm is paid to view,
define, and analyze one or several aspects of the organiza-
tion. Their work usually concludes with recommendations for
changes. These changes may be organizational (structural or
personnel) or tangibles (new machines or the implementation
of new technologies involving communications, data
processing, etc.). The results of this work may or may not
result in action by the organization. But if the recommenda-
tions are acted upon the changes will usually involve cost,
especially in terms of tangibles, that may be continued for
several years to follow. These costs are referred to as
systems cost.
The preceding distinction is important to the anal-
ysis that follows to the extent that, although to do either
requires that something must be given up (if our budget
constraint remains constant) , the expected duration of the
new cost may have an effect on the decision of what to give
up. The point should be made that if the expected benefit of
the new service is of low relative ranking to the benefits
offered by those services for which the organization is
already expending funds the decision may be made to give up
nothing and forgo the expected benefits of the new service
and the process stops. In the case where the relative
benefit is high enough to make it desirable, the user is
faced with the decision of what to give up. Here again there
are options. The user can simply list all the services and
their associated cost (including the potential service) in
the order of the determined value of their associated
benefits. Then starting with the most valued work down the
list until a level matching the maximum expenditure level
allowed by the budget constraint is reached. At that point
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the user draws a line and gives up, for a period of time
(determined by the class of service - analysis or system)
,
those services which fall below the line representing the
expenditure level. This method may be referred tc as the
deletion method. Many times however, to follow the above
method is not practical as it would, among other things,
indicate that the need for those services discarded was
questionable to start with. A more plausible approach might
be to adjust the levels of some designated services and thus
combining reductions in cost enable the organization to
retain the services while at the same time meeting the level
of total expenditures defined by the prescribed budget
constraint. This is referred to as the reduction method of
expenditure reduction and is described in the next section.
This thesis will confine itself to the question of
the possible expenditure for an analysis service, which
therefore requires a relatively short term adjustment to
expenditures to fund the cost of the analysis. Also it is
assumed that after some managerial consideration it was
determined that the reduction method of expenditure adjust-
ment was deemed the most desirable method of releasing
revenues to fund the analysis service. Further, to simplify
somewhat the analysis of the problem, it is assumed that
management has narrowed down the area to be reduced to one
or a combination of two present services. This reduction is
to be considered to be needed for the period in which the
analysis cost is incurred, one year. This eliminates the
need for adjusting fcr the value of money over time, which
can be added to the analysis of the longer term system's
cost decision problem.
a. The Reduction Method Analysis
The first criteria to be met in this problem is
that the combined expenditures (E) for those two services
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designated ty management for reduction must not exceed that
portion of the budget allocated to them (B) . That is:
E < B (2.1)
The expenditure for the first service can be defined as the
cost of that service per unit (p1) times the number of units
(S1) of that service desired. Thus for the first service the
expenditure can be given by:
p1S1 (2.2)
The same logic is followed for the second service (S2) and
its unit price (p2) . The combined expenditures then can be
presented as:
E = p1S1 + p2S2 (2.3)
As discussed previously the combined expenditures must not
exceed seme predetermined budget constraint. Thus,
E = p1£ 1 + p2S2 < E (2.4)
Foregoing the budget consraint for the moment, there are an
infinite number of possible combinations of S1 and S2. Some
combinations may be preferred by management over others.
However, there are other combinations for which management
is equally satisfied. In other words, one combination of
services could be substituted for the other. These combina-
tions of services, for which user management is egually
satisfied, can be plotted and joined by a line to display a
geometric representation of this relationship. Referring to
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Figure 2.6, curves 1,2, 3 and 4 are representative of such
curves where combinations (points A and B on curve 3 for
example) of services along the same curve are substitutable
for each other.
Because of the infinite combination of possibil-
ities that exist there can be an infinite number of these
substitution curves. At this point it may be beneficial to
summarize some points: 1) there exist an infinite number of
combinations of services 2) some of which can be evaluated
by the user as being egually desirable and 3) these families
of combinations (substitution curves) can be ordered in
terms of relative desirability.
Logic would tell one that the user would prefer
that substitution curve which gave most of both services and
the user would therefore choose any combination of services
on say curve 4 over any combination found on curve 2 (It
should be noted that it is not to be inferred that those
combinations on curve 4 are neccessarily twice as desirable
as those on curve 2) . The user's choice is really confined
by only two factors - the technological feasibility of the
combinations and the self-imposed expenditure limit as
defined ty the budget constraint.
Analytically the substitution curves can be
described by the slope between any two points on the curve.
The slope can further be described as the change in the
guantity of service two (S2) relative to the change in quan-
tity of service one (S1) . Because of the orientation cf the
axis ir> Figure 2.6 the negative slope must be taken in order
to result in a positive numerical figure. Symbolically the
relationship would be:
This change can alsc be thought of as a marginal change in
the level of one service as compared to the change in the
level of another service, both of which are on the same
substitution curve. lor reference purposes the slope
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Figure 2.6 Substitution Curves,
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as2/dS1 = slope < (2.5)
will te called the Marginal Rate of Substitution,
MRS(S1,S2). Thus it can be said that:
MRS(S1,S2) = -dS2/dS1 (2.6)
The budget constraint can also be represented
geometrically. The budget constraint is a line, the slope of
which is defined as the ratio of the marginal cost of
service one (p1S1) as compared to the marginal cost of
service two (p2S2) . Thus the budget constraint (B) can be
represented by a line with slope:
p1S1/p2S2 (2.7)
Utilizing these concepts it can be seen that for
a given substitution curve, the optimum mix of S1 and S2 is
where the prescribed budget constraint line just touches (is
tangent to) a given substitution curve. This tangent point
is defined mathematically as where the slopes of the two
lines are equal. Thus, where:
-dS2/dS1 = -p1S1/p2£2 (2.8)
Graphically this can be represented by displaying both the
substitution curves and the possible budget constraint lines
on the same graph. The relationship is displayed in Figure
2.7. Obviously which substitution curve/budget line combi-
nation to use is determined by the level of the budget









Figure 2.7 Optimum Mix of Services.
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5 • 1& luation of Potential Benefits
Touched upon earlier in this chapter was the idea
that benefits, both of the present services and the poten-
tial benefits of the prospective services, should be valued
and ranked. Left unanswered was the question of how to value
such things. The problem is that there is no iron-clad,
one-formula-fits-all answer to the question. What is the
value of a service? That depends on the service and to whom
the question is directed. Depending upon the user's view,
the same service can be valued differently by different
users. Taking a hardware example to illustrate, consider two
processors - processor A can perform 100 transactions per
second (IPS) and processor B can perform 120 TPS. Therefore
cne might say that, based on TPS capability, processor B is
of more value than processor A. But how much more valuable?
Is the additional 20 TPS offered by processor E worth
$10,000 ? Is it worth $20,000 ? Perhaps only $5,000 is all
the additional TPS capability is worth ? The answer could be
"yes" to any of the questions. It is dependent upon the
prospective user's view of the value of the benefit, in this
case, of a capability to process an additional 20 TPS. That
user's view is shaped by the particular application, needs,
size of the operation, revenue available, etc.
This is particularly true for the valuation of some-
thing like an analysis cost. How much is it worth to have an
outside expert evaluate one's data communication structure
and recommend changes ? Answer: it depends. It depends on
the client's perspective of the present condition and the
effectiveness of data communications, on the size of data
communications costs relative to the companies operating
budget, the perceived value of the potential improvements,
the value of competing demands on revenue, etc. Thus, the
value to be derived from an analysis of costs is in fact
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very subjective and must be determined on an individual
basis. The question may become, " Given the impact of this
area on the total operation of the organization, can the
organization afford net to seek or invest in the search for
improvements ?".
Hopefully the product of the analysis will be recom-
mendations for changes that have attached to them quantifi-
able benefits in terms of increased efficiency,
effectiveness or reduced cost. Armed with this information
the user is in a position to go through an analysis, such as
the one described earlier in this chapter, to evaluate the
optimum mix of services/products given a budget level
constraint.
6- Case of Two Potential Alternatives
If the analysis results in a decision between two
services that cannot be mixed as described earlier, a
straight one-or-the-other decision may be made using ether
decision criteria. For instance, if tne analysis offers two
alternatives for improving effectiveness (each with its own
associated cost), which should the user select? Again
different sources offer different solutions to this problem.
Cne such source is Barry W. Boehm £ Ref . 3] who pres-
ents several possibilities in regard to software but which
could also be applied to the more general cases under
discussion here. It should be noted at this point that all
three irodels to be discussed assume that measures have been
determined to approximate the relative effectiveness of the
services and their cost.
The first mentioned is the Maximum Availarle Budget
method, deferring to Figure 2.8, if the budget constraint is
$100,000 then the choice must be alternative A with an
effectiveness of 50 units. In many cases this is where the
decision falls, a simple matter of the bottom line - money
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available. If the effectiveness can be quantified with seme
high level of confidence and the organization has some flex-
ibility in the budget available to be allocated to the new
service, then the additional effectiveness to be realized
from say a 10* increase in the budget should be examined.
Referring again to Figure 2.8, expending an additional
$10,00C (107-) would eguate to 75 units of effectiveness, a
50% gain. If, on the other hand, the decision has been made
not to spend any funds unless a certain baseline effective-
ness can be realized, then the choice is simplified tc the
least cost alternative which supplies that level of effec-
tiveness. Referring to Figure 2.8, to attain an effective-
ness of 75 units alternative A is the obvious choice.
If the organization is interested in acquiring the
most "bang for the buck" or effectiveness/dollar spent, an
effctiveness/cost ratio can be examined. It is obvious that
a line can be drawn along which each point represents the
same ratio of effectiveness to cost. Such lines are shown as
"X", "Y", and "Z" in Figure 2.9. Given the desire to
maximize effectiveness per dollar spent, the choice in the
case shown would be where the line representing the highest
ratio touches one of the alternative cost lines (pcint C) .
This choice seems logically sound and can be used as long as
the point selected falls within any budget and minimum
requirements constraint which may have been placed upon the
decision.
Lastly, another model presented by Boehm is referred
to as the Maximum Effectiveness-Cost Difference criteria. It
assumes that there is a way to relate cost and effectiveness
on the same scale. In other words, one can then measure
effectiveness in terms of both effectiveness units and
dollar worth. Thus, ence a dollar value has been assigned to
each effectiveness unit, the alternatives can be evaluated
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Figure 2.8 Haximum Available Budget Method.
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wher€ effectiveness dollar value is equal to the cost in
dollars. The point cf maximum effectiveness-cost difference
then is that point on the alternative's cost curve which is
the highest above tte line "1". Referring again to Figure
2.10 one could easily calculate the point and the amount
which represent the iraximum difference between the effec-
tiveness offered by alternative A and the line "L" and
conclude that the difference graphically represents $55,000.
A similar calculation of the difference in the case of
alternative B would conclude an amount of $80,000. As the
name implies, one would want to maximize the difference and
would therefore select alternative B in this illustration.
As before this criteria may result in a solid decision as
long as any budget constraint and or minimum effectiveness
requirements are observed. [Eef. 3]
7 . Conclusions
In summary, the user organization must consider
numerous aspects of potential cost and potential benefits
when approaching a decision on expending revenues for a new
service/product. This section looked at a series of logical
steps in the decision process. It started with the cbvious,
but still often overlooked, question of the pertinence of
the potential benefits to the specific user. Also considered
were the questions of in-house vs. contracting out, freeing
revenue to pay for the new service, and differentiating
analysis as a cost from a system or implementation cost. The
valuation of potential benefits was dicussed and finally
methods for deciding between two potential services, both of
which can be measured in some common unit of measurement,
were presented.
This chapter has covered a considerable amount of
ground and purposely not in the greatest of detail. The
point cf this chapter however, was not to be the focus of
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this thesis, but, rather a background from which to view the
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III. NARE ACS FROM A NIF PERSPECTIVE
A. INTECDOCTION
A 1978 General Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled
"Accounting for Automatic Data Processing Costs Needs
Improvement" disclosed that many Federal agencies were
employing inadequate accounting methods for capturing the
relevant costs for Automatic Data Processing (ADP) opera-
tions. Cited in the report was the impact of inaccurate
costs on both supplier organizations and user organizations.
Cn the one hand, ADP managers providing the services were
confronted with the problem of choosing from less than
optimum alternatives for equipment replacements or enhance-
ments given the inaccurate cost information. Moreover, the
charges for ADP services performed could not be allocated
with the degree of accuracy needed to ensure fairness. On
the other hand, the managers of user organizations found it
nearly impossible to accurately forecast or budget for the
implementation and operation of desired services. [Ref. 4]
In short, the report argued that the mission funded concept
was inappropriate for acceptable accounting in the ADP envi-
ronment. In response to the GAO report as well as subsequent
Congressional studies, the Navy recommended the inclusicn of
Navy Regional Automated Data Centers (NARDACs) under the
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) concept as part of the Navy input
to the Fiscal Year (F"2) 1984 Presidential Budget. NARDACs
are service centers providing regionalized ADP technical and
operational support to client Navy activities to fulfill
organic data processing requirements. [Ref. 5]. The thrust
of this chapter is to explore the implications of NIF
funding as it relates to the operation of NARDAC in its role
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as supplier as well as the attendant impact on user organi-
zations. Organized chronologically as much as practicable,
this chapter will first present a brief perspective of
NARDAC cost accounting prior to the implementation of NIF
accounting and will be followed by an overview of industrial
funding. Rate stabilization will be discussed next and then
the implications of rate stabilization and conversion to
strictly reimbursable funding will be examined. Finally, a
brief evaluation will be provided on the effectiveness of
NIF funding for computer services.
B. NABEAC PRIOR TO NIF
Prior to FY 1984, the Resource Management System (RMS)
was employed to budget for, account for, manage, and report
the use of Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) financial
resources for NARDAC operations. RMS entailed a single
source of funding which provided Commanding Officers some
degree of spending discretion in the conduct of normal oper-
ations. In contrast to providing funding in the form of
numerous allotments with separate ceilings for various
specific areas, RMS introduced greater flexibility in
consuming financial resources under continually changing
priorities and conditions. As in NIF accounting, RMS
featured double entry bookkeeping and accrual accounting.
RMS accounting also manifested shortcomings when considering
the nature of the NARDAC enterprise. The degree of cost
accumulation necessary for accurate distribution of overhead
costs was unavailable in RMS accounting. Further, the prin-
cipal use of RMS was to account functionally for the use of
appropriations type funding. In the area of performance
measurement, RMS provided only performance reports for
comparing actual expense information to budgeted expense
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data fcr a particular period. Performance measures for a
comparable private activity would be gleaned from statements
of operating results and balance sheets for individual cost
centers. Data processing costs could not be identified sepa-
rately since they were only a portion of program costs and
costs were tracked by program with disbursements teing
tracked by appropriation. Finally, ADP services for mission
funded requirements were provided to users as a "free" good
or service. In other words, users were not charged unless
the work (and therefore the costs) was unprogrammed and in
such instances, only direct, identifiable, "out of pccket"
costs could be billed. RMS did not lend itself to capturing
such data for an individual user activity. In an effort to
remedy the identified shortcomings as well as to comply with
the accounting guidelines provided in the GAO report, a
chargeback system was implemented at NAEDAC on an informal
basis. The chargeback system was expected to penit
capturing fair and accurate cost data and to reflect the
total cost of operating the service center. To accomplish
this, the chargeback system was to include the following
characteristics:
1. Equitable - users must be billed only for relevant
charges
2. Eepeatable - the level of effort, irrespective of
system load, personnel workload, etc., must be the
driving factor for determining the cost of a partic-
ular job. In ether words, the cost for the same job
under different conditions should be consistent
3. Accurate - user charges must be computed precisely
4. Understandable - the composition of charges must be
apparent to the users
5. Auditable - external sources must be able to trace
charges back tc their origins
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6. Ccst recovery - all costs of operation must be recov-
ered
7. Stability of charges - charges mast be sufficiently
stable to peririt user planning
8. Promote efficient use of resources - charges should
reward efficient users and tax inefficient ones.
[fief. 6]
C. NIP CYERVIEW
In order to assess the implications of NARDACs operating
within the NIF environment, it is imperative to gain a thor-
ough understanding of the NIF system. NIF is a working
capital fund. "A working capital fund is a revolving fund
used as a source of financing for work (or services) that
will be paid by the customer after completion of the job.
The activity performing the work pays for costs incurred out
of its working capital fund during job accomplishment. When
the job is complete, the customer is billed and the fund is
reimbursed. The goal of a Department of Defense (DCD)
working capital fund is to recover all costs and work to a
zero profit." [Ref. 7] A revolving fund is inaugurated by
an initial funding f rem Congress called a "corpus. " In crder
to capitalize and finance the NIF activity as an entity, a
charter is issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) .
Customer activities provide reimbursement from appropri-
ated funds. Dollars also flow between NIF and another
revolving fund, the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) - in one case in
payment for materials consumed by the NIF activity and in
the other case in payment for work accomplished for the NSF
activity by the NIF activity. In theory, reimbursement would
return the corpus of the revolving fund to its previous
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level. In practice, however, this seldom occurs. With the
advent of "stabilized rates", NIF activities tend to receive
reimbursement from clients at a rate slightly different than
the actual cost. For this reason, there is usually a profit
or loss associated with each transaction. Consequently, at
any point in time, there is usually a credit or detit
balance in the corpus of the revolving fund.
As with the other revolving fund, NSF, there are occa-
sions when a direct injection of cash is required. This cash
augmentation comes ficm direct appropriation and is provided
basically for two reasons. One reason involves expansion.
Should a significant expansion of NIF business be antici-
pated, it would be reasonable to effect a commensurate
increase in the corpus to accomodate the expansion. Ihe
other reason for increasing the corpus directly through
appropriation involves "stabilized" rate changes. Pay raises
and other escalating costs can impact the corpus dramati-
cally when the stabilized rates are significantly lower than
the actual costs of performing the services. To offset the
net effect of such escalating factors, an appropriate
increase in the corpus must be provided occasionally (nearly
annually) so that the fund can "revolve" as designed.
Supplemental appropriations provide the vehicle for this
direct injection. [Eef. 8]
The NIF accounting system resembles the typical private
enterprise in many respects. Accordingly, both the NIF
budgets and the execution reports are in the format of
balance sheets, income statements, and selected statistics.
Characteristically, the balance sheet contains the three
major sections of assets, liabilities, and owner's equity.
With minor exceptions in the asset and owner's equity
sections, the accounts contained in the major sections are
very similar to those in private industry. On the asset
side, as of 1981 the book value of all land, equipment, and
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other fixed assets -were capitalized into the NIF leading
eventually to the inclusion of depreciation charges in the
stabilized rates. The capitalization of NARDAC computer
assets is a crucial factor since there is no consensus on
how to treat software and databases. With the exception of
work-in-progress, the asset accounts are not atypical of a
private concern. The work-in-progress account, a non-cash
account, is fundamentally a temporary account for financing
the costs of performing the services until the work is
completed. At the completion of the work, the asset can be
converted to "cash" by way of the billings. In the owner's
equity section, the corpus account provides the current
balance of the initial funding cf the NIF. The net capitali-
zation account provides the offset for the value of the
capitalized fixed assets. The accumulated operating results
account is somewhat equivalent to the retained earnings in a
business enterprise and it reflects the net gain or loss
since the inception of the fund. The equity reserves
account is the vehicle for driving budget year rates.
Increases or decreases in this account can increase or
decrease the cash account balance. In actuality, retained
earnings is a combination of the accumulated operating
results and the equity reserves. The NIF income statement
contains three sections: revenue, costs, and operating
results. Key to interpretation of the income statement is
revenue recognition. There are basically two methods for
this. One method is based on project completion while the
other is based on work progress. [Eef. 8]
The total cost of operating a NIF activity can be devel-
oped from the three major categories of direct labor/
materials, production overhead, and general and
administrative overhead. To recoup these costs three methods
can be employed in charging customers. The reimbursable
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cost method recoups all the costs and includes military
salaries. The predetermined rates method excludes military
salaries and can be used to recoup prior years' losses.
Finally, the fixed cost method is a contractual agreement
vith the price determined from the application of predeter-
mined rates to the expected scope of the project.
Industrial funding extends several significant advan-
tages to an environment in which services are rendered to
ether activities. To begin with, the relationship between
the industrial activity and the customer is altered to one
of "seller - buyer." Cn the one hand, the supplying activity
must accurately define the work and equally as important
must provide a precise cost estimate. On the other hand, the
client activity must be cost conscious since no longer is
the good/service "free." In short, the customer must plan
better in budgeting for appropriations required to buy
needed work. Second, the cost accounting system, which is
mandatory, allows costs to be related to the specific job.
In effect, this provides visibility of "total cost per unit"
for products and services. This visibility precipitates
additional benefits. Not only is effective control cf costs
provided but also standard pricing is developed and accurate
costs can be projected. Additionally, since the services
must be paid for, the buyer can be critical of the delivera-
bles. This tends to contribute to lower unit costs of
production. More importantly, services would be requested
judiciously and only the needed services would be reguested.
Next, the NIF as a working capital fund affords greater
freedom and flexibility when compared to the congressional
appropriation funding cycle. Finally, the consolidation of
similar activities under the NIF concept serves to mitigate
duplication resulting from the availability of like services
from comparable facilities- [Eef. 8]
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As previously mentioned, the goal of DOD working capital
funds is to recover all costs and work to a zero profit.
From a conceptual pcint of view, costs, both direct and
indirect, are billed to customers in such fashion that total
reimbursement would be received. In other words, the cost to
the customer should be the cost to the industrial activity.
This wculd allow the funds received in payment to restore
the working capital fund so that continued operation can be
financed. Under a nonprofit system, cost overruns are in
effect losses but they are considerably different than
"losses" experienced in a private concern as reduced
profits. In reality, NIF losses are manifested as a decrease
in the capital of the fund. Temporary profits (increases in
the corpus) also occur. These temporary profits (and losses)
are considered when budgeting on a "break even" basis. In
order to return the accumulated operating results to zero,
rates are adjusted. Ey dint of DOD rate stabilization poli-
cies, rates are established for NIF activities and are
expected to remain in effect for the entire fiscal year with
changes made during the fiscal year only upon the approval
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
D. EA1E STABILIZATION
One of the major criticisms contained in the GAO report
concerned the inability of user activities to plan or budget
for the acquisition of needed services. Stabilized rates
provide a means of alleviating this problem by permitting
customers to plan projects based on known rates rather than
estimates. An additional benefit results from the elimina-
tion of cost growth which may preclude the completion of all
projects planned for a particular fiscal year. The mechanism
by which stabilized rates operate is relatively straight
53
forward. NIF activities establish fixed rates in a manner
appropriate to the service provided ( for example, CPU time,
man-hour of analyst time, etc.)* Of course there may be mere
than one rate based on the structure of the organization,
the diversity of the workload, and other considerations.
In developing and establishing the fixed rates, the NIF
activity must comply with the provisions NAVCOMPT
Instruction 7600.23b which stipulates that rates will be
aligned "to recover operating costs". Further, the direc-
tive requires that gains and losses "will normally be offset
during the year fcllowing their occurence and will be
reflected uniformly in the rates of the Activity Group."
Unfortunately the repetitive nature of the review process
for stabilized rates results in proposed rates being
adjusted at various levels in the command chain.
Consequently, rates actually implemented represent adjust-
ments and modifications to the original locally developed
rates (bottom-up approach). In short, local control of rates
has been surrendered in favor of greater centralization at
the Activity Group level or higher. Part of the consequences
of this loss in autonomy at the local level is that vari-
ances will almost always exist between the stabilized rate
billings and the actual costs. This has contributed to the
condition in which ar industrial activity is always in a
position of making a profit or a loss and retroactively
working toward zero profit (or loss) . It is a problematic
situation since a profit or a loss is recognized only after
the next year's rates have been established and the offset
for that particular profit or loss is not implemented until
the establishment of the third year's rates. In a very real
sense the industrial activity's operation is extended from
an annual to a cumulative triennal basis. [Ref. 9]
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E. IMPLICATIONS OF RATE STABILIZATION AND NIF CONVEESION
Since stabilized rates remain in effect for one year and
striving to achieve a zero cumulative profit/loss requires
three years, NIF funding of NARDACs contributes little in
the way of performance measurement. This is particularly
true when considering the activity commander's relatively
short tour length. In mitigation of this situation, however,
the previously mentioned loss of autonomy on the part of the
activity commander must be considered. [Eef. 9]
Another implication of the rate stabilization process
centers around the submission of budgets by the user activi-
ties. rjy the time tie stabilized ratis are announced, t- p
user's input for the annual Presidential Budget has already
been submitted. The final stabilized rates are available
only in time for the construction of the apportionment year
column of the next year's President's Budget. In short,
rates are stabilized about one year too late to be used as
an effective planning tool for appropriations budgeting.
[Eef. 8]
There are other implications that merit mention. NAEDACs
provide regionalized services where local prices for various
commodities , e.g., labor, utilities, etc., are very likely
to vary for different regions. In other words, the cost of
providing the same service may be different depending on the
region but stabilized rates impose the identical prices for
that service. This is of major concern to a NAREAC
Commanding Officer (CC) since the CO may be in the unenviable
position of having to charge a far higher rate for a similar
service that another NARDAC provides at a lower rate because
of more favorable local prices for labor utilities, etc.
[Eef. 8]
In the short term, rate stabilization is prone to mask
the true cost of operations at the NARDAC. An obvious
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example of this situation occurs when an increase in costs
(e.g., telecommunications costs, utilities, etc.) cannct be
passed on to the client activities because of the stabilized
rates. The end result is that customers have no incentive to
conserve since the rates are fixed and therefore the costs
are absorbed by the industrial activity until recoupment can
be effected. [Ref. 9^
Largely because the NIF concept requires the customers
to reimburse the provider of the services for actual DP
services (CPU time, systems analysis labor, etc. ) , seme form
of a computer chargeback system is essential for capturing
usage data by customer. Fortunately, the informal chargeback
system inplemented at NARDACs prior to fiscal year 1984 was
adequate for this purpose and it greatly facilitated the
conversion of NARDACs to the NIF system.
F. EFFECTIVENESS OF NIF FOR COMPUTER SERVICES
Partly because the informal chargeback system which
complemented NIF was in-place, industrial funding of NARDACs
was implemented relatively painlessly. Most important, the
NIF system* seems to have remedied the criticises levied in
the GAO report as well as to have met Navy financial manage-
ment requirements. This can be made readily apparent by a
brief evaluation of relevant factors in comparing the system
at the NAEDACs prior to NIF funding with the system as it is
now with NIF implemented. To begin with, industrial funding
provides for the accumulation of the full costs (both direct
and indirect) for providing the data processing services as
opposed to EMS which provided only the direct costs. Second,
NIF allows full cost recovery by permitting the NARDAC to
charge customer activities for the fall cost -> f jobs based
on the cccts accumulated by the cost accounting system. This
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is in contrast to nission funding which permitted the
recovery of only direct, identifiable, "out of pocket" costs
for services proviled to fulfill unprogrammed requirements.
Next, industrial funding provides cost data sufficiently
accurate to facilitate decisions on future enhancements and
replacements (i.e., ccst - benefit decisions). Moreover, the
buyer-soller relationship aspect of industrial fun.ling
forces users to be cost conscious and places the user
activity in the position of having to decide on reguiremt. :.ts
and to justify them. NIF also makes possible the accumula-
tion of cost data on both a program basis for the customers'
budgets and on Data Processing basis of special interest to
the FAi;iAC budgets. Segarling stabilized rates, custoiaers
can tetter rely on receiving the wor.< they had planned :or
at the -udgcted cost (although this is not always the ca i ,
it is retter than with b.\S) . With respect to demand _or
services, industrial funding provides an accurate represen-
tation of user activity requirements, thereby permitting
sufficient" justification for additional equipment,
personnel, etc. Finally, NAP.DACs are freed from the exacer-
bating annual appropriations process since working capital
funds are employed in its operation. £ Ref • 6: pp. 96-102]
In summary, the Navy Industrial Fund system for NARDACs
seems to be the only viable alternative available to satisfy
GAO guidelines and to remain within financial management
guidelines of the Navy and the Department of Defense.
Whether it works or net is largely an issue of perception.
From the user perspective, the chargeout system seems to
suffer from the typical unsatisfactory consequences of most
chargeout systems. First of all, the charges that appear on
the periodic statements for the users are relatively complex
and unintelligible to the less sophisticated user manager.
Moreover, there are no provisions for holding the NARDACs
responsible for inefficiency variances. The principal
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mechanism for this is the seller/buyer relationship between
NAHDACs and their cli€nts.
As previously mentioned, the introduction of stabilized
rates into the charging algorithm causes artificial prices
in relation to the current true actual costs. Therefore, in
any given year the charges do not relate to the incremental
costs associated with the service provided. Although the
stabilized rates provide a measure of predictability, the
more critical issue for customer managers may be primarily
one of how much the service costs. The implementation of





The reasons for linking computers whether in a local
area network (LAN) or in a long haul network are very
similar to those for distributed data processing. The
significant developments in both hardware and software have
resulted in a reduction in the physical size of data
processirg equipment as well as an increase in speed. This,
in turn, has resulted in a shift away from the large
centralized computer facility of the 1970' s. There were many
factors for this shift.
To begin with, the era of minicomputers and microcom-
puters contributed to the cost of processors declining at a
rapid rate. It became evident that a computer system could
be comprised of many processors if the application required
and at a small incremental cost. Along with this factor, the
concept of a single data processing center which conducted
all the computer related activity for an organization was
subverted by user demands for personal computing resources.
In the beginning, these microcomputer "work stations" were
permitted to proliferate at an uncontrolled rate. As users
became more sophisticated in the use of their personal
machines, an increased awareness of the potential of
processing power resulted. The situation described in the
foregoing is consistent with Eichard L. Nolan's model of
organizational learning in regards to ADP. Briefly, there






The initiation stage entails an organization's identifica-
tion of a technology that may be suitable for use. It is
treated by the organization in a similar fashion as a
research and development project would be treated. The
second stage involves a proliferation of the technology
caused ty experimentation and rapid user learning and
acceptance. In other words, user awareness of the capabili-
ties of the technology help cause the technology to become
contagious. The control stage is characterized by manage-
ment's concern to ensure efficient utilization of the now
widespread technology. The maturity stage occurs when
management controls are in place and it suggests that
further transfer of technology is not possible. [Eef. 10]
In the context of Nolan's model, the initiation stage
quickly transitioned to the contagion or proliferation
stage. From the ccntagion stage it is easy to see how
management interceded in an attempt to gain control (Nolan's
third stage). The principal effect of management's attempt
to gain control was the convergence of two formerly separate
technologies. Unfortunately, the two technologies, data
processing and telecommunications, had different management
practices and problems were encountered in their merger.
[Ref. 10]
One key difference between telecommunications and auto-
mated data processing concerns their evolution and business
environment. The telecommunications industry had a "head
start" and steadily evolved over a much longer period of
time than the computer industry. Another key factor was the
monopolistic nature of telecommunications services as
opposed to the more competitive nature of data processing.
Although this has changed somewhat with the divestiture of
AT&T, many of the management influences and impressions
remain. Fundamentally there were several differences in the
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management concerns for the two. On the one hand, the
acquisition of telecommunications services was a passive
problem. Since ATST was viewed as the only source for tele-
communications services and prices were seldom if ever nego-
tiated (tariffs were regulated), there was little for
management to do but to accept these costs as "sunk". On the
ADP side, the purchase or lease of computing power was a
major economic consideration and subject to cost/benefit
analysis as well as possible capital expenditures.
A brief examination of corporate trends can illustrate
the convergence of the two technologies. ATST and seme of
its divested companies (as well as other independent commu-
nications companies) have moved into the computer market and
are building, marketing, and selling their own computers.
IBM and other computer manufacturers are building complete
communications systems both for company use and as product
lines. The point of the illustration is that the technolo-
gies have converged and have become integrated with each
other in many respects. The" formerly separate services can
be acguired from a single source (supplier) . There remain,
however, the ubiquitous concerns for managing the overall
systems and with which community primary management respon-
sibility should rest.
This chapter will seek not to address the management
issues yet but to provide a basis for further discussion of
computers and data communications. BriJily, this chapter will
focus on the reasons for linking computers, the uses which
can be derived from linking computers, and some of the ways
computers can be linked.
B. TEE REASONS
As previously stated, the computer industry is rela-
tively young when compared to the telecommunications
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industry. In its short life, the computer industry has made
enormous progress and evolved from strictly specialty appli-
cations (primarily scientific) to providing general systems
for a variety of applications (process control, operations,
etc.) . In fact, data processing or more accurately informa-
tion systems cross many organizational boundaries and have
become acknowledged as requiring strategic positions in
organizational structures. This seems to be a natural evolu-
tion since resources must be managed and management includes
higher level planning efforts as tne importance of the
resource increases.
There are several factors driving the trend towards
linking computers in some form - normally in a network. The
first, of course, is the already mentioned proliferation of
microcomputers and in some respects the mainframe computers.
In most cases, these computers were acquired without regard
to needs or requirements of ether organizational entities.
The end result of this uncoordinated effort was the wide-
spread duplication of data as well as inaccessibility of
needed data and, most important, loss of management control.
The lessens learned from the evolution of the large main-
frame computers were not heeded. In other words, micro-
processors were allowed to spread randomly and the lessens
of structured or incremental evolution were largely ignored.
Consequently, resource sharing was made difficult if not
impossible. flhen management finally became aware of the
potentials and capabilities of sharing computer resources,
it was discovered that the efforts to integrate the various
systems would be significant. Nevertheless, the principal
goal formulated by management almost unanimously was to tie
together or connect the various computer resources so that
needed information could be fetched from wherever it was
located. Naturally, this information could be located at
several physical sites and could be combined to provide more
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meaning. Put in simpler context, the overall reason for
linking computers is to allow data, processing power, appli-
cations, or any other computer resource to be conveniently
available in a transparent manner to users. Transparency in
this case alludes to the physical location of either the
user or the computing resource.
A second reason for linking computers is to provide for
increased reliability. Increased reliability can be achieved
if back up systems are available but this is not always
economically viable. Connecting computers to each other can
provide alternative sources of computing capability in the
event of a disruption of services at one node. With stand
alone processors, a failure in the system will suspend
services for the duration of the failure. In many applica-
tions, this loss of computing power can be catastrophic to
operations. A good example of this is the Trans World
Airlines (TWA) reservation system which is implemented by a
star network. The less of computer resources at TWA would
virtually shutdown its operations. This is the principal
reason the TWA network also includes an identical central
processor for its back up operations. The TWA system is at
one end of a continuum where reliability is extremely
crucial. At the other end of the spectrum where reliability
is not a factor, a stand alone computer will provide the
necessary capability. Between the two extremes are degrees
of reliability which can be selected by choice of network
architecture. The choice is largely judgemental and varies
with many factors including corporate culture and maturity
of the organization with respect to information processing.
In most cases networks allow some flexibility in the event
of the loss of a single computing node by providing for
substitute computing power elsewhere on the net.
Another important reason for connecting computers has to
do with distribution of processing power. In a large number
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cf applications, it makes sense to capture and to prccess
the data locally. Previously, communication costs were lower
than computing costs and it was sensible to capture certain
data at dispersed locations for later transmission to
central computing facilities for processing. With the enor-
mous decline in computing costs, many processing applica-
tions can be offloaded to satellite sites cheaply. These
applications may include data collection, data storage, data
base processing, routing, editing, analysis, and a host of
other functions. These computing functions scattered at
various locations can provide many benefits including seme
degree of local user autonomy in the computer environment,
the potential for greater user-productivity, access to
remote data as well as increased processing power, and
decentralized operations. Some additional benefits include
more accurate input data with increased user involvement,
greater user responsifcility for input/output/cost effective-
ness, and increased user influence in optimizing operations.
The final reason for connecting computers is somewhat
related to the foregoing reason. With the ability to
distribute processing power there has also been the vastly
improved cost/performance ratio of small computers in rela-
tion to the large computers. With applications or functions
which do not require the extensive instructions nor the high
powered arithmetic and data manipulation operations avail-
able on the large mainframes, there has been a growing trend
to design computer systems consisting of many smaller
computers in a network. These networks can be often designed
in such a way that they can outperform single large main-
frame computers. This often can be achie/ed at more econom-
ical costs and provides greater flexibility for expansion
(i.e., adding computers/nodes). Additionally, there are many
"off-the-shelf" application packages available virtually
eliminating software development costs. Software design
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would in all likelihood be much simpler and the complexity
normally associated with large computers can be largely
eliminated. This trend has occurred primarily when the
processors can be physically located close together and is
referred to as local area networks (LANs)
.
C. Ill OSES
linking computers provides many uses in various forms.
However, the uses fall essentially under three basic catego-
ries. The first category of computer network use involves
access to processing power. The second concerns access to
data and the final category relates computer networks to
communications in the generic sense. Each of these catego-
ries will be discussed in turn in the following paragraphs.
As briefly discussed in the section on the reasons for
linking computers, the distribution of processing power
offers great flexibility and economy in an organization.
Where most of the processing can occur locally, but occa-
sional access to a larger computer is required, significant
benefits can result from having access locally to a computer
capable cf greater processing power. A good rule of thumb is
the 80/20 criteria. 80 per cent of the processing should be
accomplished locally and 20 per cent at the larger remote
site [Eef- 11]. Included in this concept is the avail-
ability of applications or programs not available locally
but available at remote locations. The Defense Data Network
(DDN) provides a good example of this idea.
Comprised of the Military Network (MILNET) and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (formerly
ARPANET) , DDN employs packet switching technology to connect
various heterogeneous host computers into each network.
Transparent gateways provide inter-net connections. At each
node various application programs are resident. Some are
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common tc many hosts and some are unique application pack-
ages. By simply using the universal "TELNET" command,
another host may be accessed and the application programs of
that particular computer may be used as if the programs were
resident at the original host (assuming access authorization
has been granted to the user for both sites) . Achieving the
processing power of an entirely different host is accom-
plished in a completely transparent manner. In ether words,
the distance of the remote site remains hidden to the user.
In similar fashion the concept can be scaled down to a
much lower level. In providing the capability to link
microcomputers, local area networks and office automation
technology have generated mass appeal for such links and the
concept appears to be on the verge of receiving wider
acceptance. The implications of allowing multiple users at
various locations to share software application packages
include:
1. more efficient and economical use of "off-the-shelf"
software;
2. less redundancy and costs of identical applications;
and
3. increased individual user productivity.
This can be best illustrated by examining the approach of
Chemical Bank, the nation's sixth largest bank in meeting
its information system needs.
Chemical Bank adopted a portfolio approach in imple-
menting its distributed data processing system. Within the
bank's system, there exist three separate systems each with
three different levels. Placed at the top level in each
system, is a centralized data processing center. The next
level contains multiple office automation systems (OAS) and
each OAS is geared towards a particular function of the
office. The lowest level contains microcomputers for
personal computing and are hooked into the office automation
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systems. Although the hardware is diversified, software
consistency or compatibility is enforced down the hierarchy.
The diversified hardware is consistent with the bank's
portofolio strategy cr approach. More specifically, with
different hardware suites (capital investments) risk is
reduced and technological uncertainty is dealt with. An
added advantage of diversifying its computer hardware is
that the bank will have a better opportunity to remain at
the frontier of computer technology.
Functionally, each of the three systems mentioned above
contain a large scale mainframe used primarily for financial
data processing. Minicomputers serve as control hardware for
the microcomputers and are considered "mainframes" at the
division level. The nicrocomputers serve as workstations for
various functions including terminal emulation and word
processing. As terminal emulators, the microcomputers are
permitted to download data and to access certain software
applications. Software is entirely compatible and can be
transported both within each level of a system and across
the three separate systems. Although this is a relatively
stringent requirement (acquisition of new software must
adhere to this requirement i.e., be capable of operating on
all three systems and at each level within a system as
well) , this consciously imposed management decision permits
a high degree of flexibility for the sharing of software
application packages. A side benefit is that training, main-
tenance, and personnel skills are facilitated.
Another important use of networks is to provide access
to data located at different and often distant sites. An
effective way of illustrating this category of application
is by describing briefly a system currently in place.
The Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALIA)
System is a major ADP system installed for the Naval
Aviation Logistics Community. Although NALDA is typically
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thought cf as a centralized, integrated and uniform data
bank of aviation logistics data, the true purpose of the
system is to provide interactive real-time access to this
data by the aviation logistics community. Not only is real-
time access available but there are also provisions for
extensive analytical capabilities available to engineers and
logisticians at remote sites. The end result of this capa-
bility is to assist the user in solving complex problems and
in making improved decisions. The NALDA concept was spawned
by the recognition cf the increased importance of rapidly
obtaining accurate logistics data, and the realization that
even if the information' was stored in some mechanized form
that often it could not be retrieved in time to be used
effectively for managers to make fully informed decisions.
When data was available in hard copy form it was quite often
in the wrong format, sorted on the wrong parameter, or not
available from a single source.
A bonus effect of the NALDA system was the reduction or
elimination of unnecessary, redundant, or overlapping data.
This was accomplished by the use of data base management
technology. Another benefit of using the real-time NALDA
system was in the analysis process itself. With the knowl-
edge that analysis is an iterative process, it was obvious
that answers to questions frequently generated more ques-
tions and that each successive question was more complex. In
short, remote real-time access to a large universal logis-
tics data base in this case provided capability for aviation
logistics managers to make complex decisions in a timely
fashion. Although frcm varied sources, the data was made
available in one central system and permitted logistics
manager to quickly obtain relevant and accurate data.
It is readily apparent that data is an important element
in infornation resource philosophy. With this realization,
it is easy to understand previously far-fetched predictions
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of everyday personal applictions as well. For example, it is
possible for travel agents to work at home with nothing more
than an inexpensive ($200) home computer and a MODEM. These
travel agents have access to airline schedules and seme
passenger reservation data and can virtually perform ail
operations at home. The natural extension of this idea is to
make this service available to all individuals. In ether
words, travel/recreation arrangements or any type of reser-
vations may be made one day entirely within the confines of
one's heme. There are many examples of personal applications
and they are only limited by the imagination. Another
example is the autcmated newspaper. With the volume of
information in just one Sunday newspaper (New York Times,
for exaiple) , it is a wonder how anyone could ever
completely read it in one day. Of course, the information is
selectively read because different people have different
interests. This idea can be applied to automated newspapers
in a nuch more efficient manner. A reader could more easily
focus en specific interests or have the information tailored
to a particular taste. For example, a reader could
subscribe to classified advertisements for homes only or for
automobiles only. A reader could obtain the latest and most
up to date information on stock market activities, on
sports, or on virtually anything now contained in a typical
newspaper and access could be made almost instantaneously.
If nothing else, the savings on paper alone would be very
significant.
The third and final area of network use has to do with
communications. Computer networks lend themselves to
providing an effective medium for communications and the use
of computer networks as a communications medium has gained
widespread popularity in the recent past. An examination of
the business sector will support this contention.
Electronic mail has gained increasing popularity and
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although it has yet to achieve widespread acceptance, it
seems destined to be commonplace in the future. This can be
best illustrated by examining a form of electronic mail,
electronic funds transfer (EFT) and its impact on the
tanking industry. The banking industry has found that
significant savings can result from reducing (or elimicating
entirely) the delays in receiving scheduled periodic
payments (for loans etc.) This delay is usually referred to
as a "flcat." For example, many banks offer EFT for payment
of mortgage (or other kinds of loans) to the lending insti-
tution (both must participate in EFT) . This frees the
borrower from having to remember to mail the periodic
(usually monthly) payment and at the same time allows the
receiving institution to "use" the payment immmediately
without the normal postal system or other kinds of delays.
In the aggregate, the savings accrued from the interest on
the individual payments accumulates to a significant amount.
Other businesses which operate on a credit basis will even-
tually take advantage of this service.
The natural extension of networks as communications
media is teleconferencing. It is not inconceivable in the
future that conferences, meetings, or appointments could be
conducted without ever moving from one's work location. This
will be enhanced by the availability of video equipment
connected to the computer network. Many applications can be
easily imagined. With the availability of memory and play-
back features, missed meetings could be "attended" at one*s
leisure. Routine or uninteresting portions could be
completely removed or only important portions of briefings
need be reviewed. Summaries by any particular categories
could be made available at the touch of a button. The
applications are almost limitless.
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D. WAYS TO LINK COMPUTERS
There are many ways to link computers and fundamentally
when computers are linked they are thought of as comprising
a network. Rather than list and describe all the possible
methods of connectivity, this section will selectively
describe the schemes cf interest. Although there are three
different sources for standardizing connectivity protocols:
1
.
manufacturers - IBM, DEC, etc.
;
2. standards organizations - International Standards
Organization;
3. ccmmon carriers - AT&T.
This chapter will concentrate primarily on the vendor
sources which seem tc be currently dominant.
In local area networks, three prevailing methods for
linking computers have been adopted by the major suppliers.
Therefore, it seems only fitting that these shculd be
described. In the lcng haul arena, the connections of the
Defense Data Network (DDN) are of primary concern and there-
fore descriptions of ether types of connection such as radio
and satellite connection will be omitted. Each of the meth-
odologies will be presented in the following paragraphs.
With the expectation that IBM will soon enter the local
area network (LAN) market, the mere thought cf IBM's
endorsement should spur on the LAN concept [Ref. 12]. With
this in mind it seems appropriate to first examine the meth-
odology expected to te adopted by IBM for tying together
computers in a local area network. IBM seems to be oriented
towards token passing as the protocol for implementing LANs.
In token passing, a specially coded electrical signal or bit
pattern (called a token) is continually transmitted
throughout the network. Whenever a station desires to
transmit a message it must first capture the token. This is
done by continuously monitoring for the special bit pattern
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as it circulates around the net. As it passes the transmit-
ting station, the token (bit pattern) is transformed tc a
different tit pattern signifying that the token and the net
has been seized and that a message follows. The transmitting
station is permitted to attach its message or message packet
to the token. Of course all these actions require cnly a
small amount of time. Included in the message packet is the
destination address and other important routing information.
The receiving station picks off the information as the bits
propagate around the network. The token is not regenerated
until the message travels back around to the transmitting
station. The implications here are that the receiving
station must provide some form of acknowledgement and that
the sending station nay monitor the actual message sent to
compare with that desired (to ensure accuracy). Overall,
token passing suggests a round-robin opportunity for each
station to send a message. Another important implication of
token passing is that great care must be exercised to ensure
that the token will not be lost. The network would be at a
standstill since there are only two modes of operation,
listen .and transmit (i.e., no station would be able to
transmit because the token does not exist and cannot be
seized) . This leads to the final important implication of
token passing. There must be provisions for detecting that
the token is lost and for its smooth regeneration.
[Bef. 13]
Another popular way of implementing a LAN was pioneered
by the XEKOX corporation [Bef. 12]. It is commonly known as
ETHERNET and employs collision avoidance and detection to
control the transmission of messages on the net. Ir an
ETHERNET, all stations monitor the net. If it appears that
no station is attempting to transmit a message, a station is
permitted to begin a message transmission but must continu-
ously monitor the net durin g the transmission for the
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purpose cf detecting any contention for the net. In the
event a collision is detected, the transmissions are immmed-
iately terminated by the stations transmitting. After a
random period of tine, a sending station is allowed to
attempt a retransmission of its message (if the net is
clear) and the cycle of monitoring and waiting randomly is
repeated as appropriate. The advantage of this method is
that tracsmission is terminated immediately upon the detec-
tion of a collision. In other methods, a complete message is
frequently sent before it is discovered that a collision has
occurred. Thus, a significant amount of time is saved. The
ETHERNET concept offers simplicity and economy for lew traf-
fice volume networks. However, in a high density message
situation, it becomes extremely difficult to get a message
transmitted.
The third and final way (that will be discussed) of
linking together automated offices is the star configuration
offered hy AT&T. As might be expected, the star network for
lANs was heavily influenced by the structure of the tele-
phone system. It is analagous to the telephone system's
central switch configuration wherein each telephone is
connected by its own separate line to a central facility.
Interconnection between any two phones is accomplished at
the central site. In the same way, computers can be linked
by a central computer. All information packets must pass
through the central computer which serves fundamentally as a
controller. As a controller, the central computer provides
the connectivity and directs the flow of information packets
to the desired destination. It is by far the simplest way to
link computers in a local area network and it is easy to
implement. The biggest disadvantage of the star LAN is that
if the central site fails, all traffic comes to a complete
halt. It is probably for this reason that AT&T also offers
collision avoidance and detection protocol similar to
ETHERNET. [Ref. 12]
73
In the long haul arena, primary focus will be on the DDN
since its use has been mandated for all data communication
needs throughout the Defense Department. The DDN employs
packet switching technology pioneered by the ARPANET.
ARPANET was started in 1969 and became operational in 1971.
It originally included 23 host computers and has expanded to
well over 100. To gain better insight to the DDN linkage, a
Irief description of ARPANET will be provided.
ARPANET is heterogeneous network in that many different
computers are on the system. Interface is accomplished by
minicomputers. Interface Message Processors (IMPs) provide
capability as store and forward packet switches which can
accomodate up to four host computers each. Terminal
Interface Processors (TIPs) are store and forward packet
switches which can accomodate up to three host computers and
63 terminals each. Terminal Access Controllers (TACs) are
stand alone terminal controllers attached to IMPs as hosts.
As previously mentioned, ARPANET is a store and forward
packet switch network. Each packet contains 1000 bits and
there are at least two separate routes between any two
nodes. Communication links are wideband and supplied by
common carriers. Message transfer time is less than 250
milliseccnds and one megabit can be transmitted 1400 miles
for less than 50 cents.
In contrast to message switching which has no limit on
the length of a message, packet switching imposes a strict
upper limit on the block size of a particular transmission.
This has several advantages. To begin with, no sender can
monopolize the transmission lines for more than the length
of a packet. Additionally, message packets can be handled in
main memory precluding the requirement of providing addi-
tional disks for buffering variable length messages (as in
message switching) . Finally, packet switching technology
provides for excellent handling of messages in an interac-
tive environment.
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The concept of packet switching is relatively simple and
straightforward. With alternate routes available between any
two nodes, a packet is transmitted through whatever route is
available at transmission time. If needed, the packet can be
stored at intermediate nodes for transmission to the ulti-
mate destination as available transmission paths permit. For
multi-packet messages, the implication is that the first
packet may be examined at the destination location even
before the entire (remaining packets) message arrives. This
reduces delays and increases throughput for the network. In
short, store and forward packet switching networks transmit
packet sized messages from IMP to IMP in a hop scotch
fashion. [Ref. 13]
The charging algorithm for store and forward packet
switching networks merit some discussion. With standard
telephone circuitry, charges are typically based on connec-
tivity time and distance. Traffic load is not a considera-
tion. In packet switching, the charge is usually based on
the numler of packets (or bits) and the connect time.






The computer industry is a major component of the
national economy and the business/government way cf doing
business. The industry is still growing and obviously shows
no signs of slowing. In 1970 spending on data processing
accounted for 2.1% of the GNP and estimates have projected
that by 1985 the spending figure will have reached 8.3% of
the GNP [Eef- 1U: p. 101]. A sizable part of the explosive
growth in spending is brought about by the emergence of new
technologies. The mcve toward distributed and shared data-
bases within a company, networks (both local area and long-
haul) and office automation, just to name a few, is the
direction of the day.
Why are these technologies so popular? As noted in the
previous chapter, two underlying reasons seem plausible - 1)
the cost of computer processing has declined considerably
over the past few years and 2) the perceived increased
potential for greater efficiency and effectiveness offered
by the newer technologies. An IBM report in 1982 high-
lighted the trend cf lowered processing cost stating,
"Processing that cost $1 in 1952 cost $0.0076 in 1981"
[Ref. 15: P-8]- Efficiency is a strong motivator in any
business situation and many believe distributed data
processing/networks are a step in that direction. These
sentiments were echoed by author M. P. Mariani, for exairple,
when he wrote,
"The trend towards multiple processors/computer networks
- distributed data processing offers the potential for
more cost effective throughput, improved system reli-
ability and natural growth paths among other features."
[Ref. 16: p. 31 ].
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There is one common thread among many of these new tech-
nologies such as networks, "smart offices", and office auto-
mation - data communications. In all cases, whether between
word processors sitting on opposite sides of a room or
computers standing half a world apart, the flow of data is
the key that allows the system to function. Mariani empha-
sizes this point in his chapter on data processing systems
by saying, "Hardware reliability is determined by both the
reliability of the nodal complex and that of the ne twor k
connecting the nodes" [Eef- 16: p.xiv].
As these new technologies grow so will the demand for
efficient and cost effective data communications. Word
processing and office automation are front page topics of
current times and the phrases are often used interchange-
ably. However, the key to office automation is not just the
act of word processing, rather it is the combining of word
processing with new advances in such areas as communications
and database technology that will account for significant
increases in efficiency and effectiveness within the organi-
zation. One example of such improvement occurred at Western
Union where, after several work stations were networked, a
monthly report that previously took 13 days to prepare could
now be done with fewer people and completed in 5 days
[Ref. 17: p. 102]. Time is money and where the introduction
of new technologies results in increased employee efficiency
and effectiveness it can usually be related to a dollar
value.
If data communications is closely related to these new
technologies then appropriate questions to ask might
include:
1. Is the acceptance of these new technologies here
today or is it on the horizon?
2. How applicable are these new technologies to the
broad spectrum of organization sizes?
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The answer to the first guestion can often be gleaned
from popular trade journals and publications. It is close to
impossible to find an issue of publications written for and
by computer system designers, operators or users (government
or civilian) which dees not contain articles on networking
or office automation. An article in a recent issue cf one
such publication proclaimed what is fast becoming an
accepted fact, "The era of office automation is, without a
doubt, here" [Eef. 18: p. 68]. The same article went en to
address the second guestion by stating,
"Once considered applicable only to large organizations,
the need for and cost effectiveness of office automation
are having an increasing greater impact in smaller,
single-site, companies" [Eef. 18: p. 68].
The O.S. government is certainly not immune to the
effect of these new advances. Arlene Triplett , associate
director for management, Office of Management and Budget,
(0M5B) recently said that "over the next few years, federal
agencies will procure tens of thousands of smale scale end-
user systems and the networks to interconnect them"
[Eef. 19: p. 44]. Triplett also indicated that OMB was
requiring all federal agency managers to develop and report
on strategies for several areas. Included were: [Eef. 19:
p.44]
1. applications cf new technologies to IBM (Information
Sesource Management) activities in a manner that is
efficient and cost effective to the government;
2. the reaching cf broad interconnection and integration
of (computer) systems; and
3. taking advantage of exploding technological develop-
ments (in the tele/data communications field) to
maximize productivity and integrate the various
media.
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From the discussion above it is obvious that data commu-
nications and the technologies that utilize it are tig busi-
ness. Just to illustrate the point, a minor sampling of
recent government contract awards included: [Ref. 20: p. 72 ]
1. A joint U.S. Air Force/Department of the Navy, $29
million, one year contract for the purchase of micro
computer systems.
2. A five year, .$22.5 million contract by the Department
of Energy for operation and systems integration
support services.
3. A ten year, $36.4 million U.S. Army contract for a
network to support its recruiting process.
The above sampling represents only a very small number
of the hundreds of examples of the money spent on systems
which have at the root of them the process of data communi-
cations. The point is that in an area of such expansion and
of such large investments of money, the utilization of
proper management becomes more than just important, it is
paramount.
E. COST IDENTIFICATION
As alluded to earlier, data communication is not a free
good, in fact according to one recent article, " Moving
computer data, for instance, is already a $4.5 billion busi-
ness and growing at mere than 20% per year" [Ref. 21: p. 74].
Data communications is big, but, the problem is in deter-
mining how big. Khat does an organization really spend on
data communications? It is a question that is extremely hard
to answer and in some cases, because of its difficulty, just
ignored. Data communications however, is becoming so inte-
gral to the ability to utilize the power of computer
processing effficiently and effectively that it can no
longer be taken for granted. Information is rapidly becoming
79
recognized as a resource, a valuable one, to be managed and
data communications can easily be defined as the flow cf the
basic units of that resource called information. One can not
truly be managed without managing the other.
It can be said that one can not truly manage what one
cannot measure. If an organization does not know how much
of a resource it is using or what the use of that resource
is costing the organization, how can standards by which to
manage the resource be set? The most optimistic answer to
that guestion would be, "with great difficulty. 1 ' The accu-
rate identification cf data communication cost is growing
even more difficult as time passes. One of the developments
that is causing the ccnfusion is the meshing of telecommuni-
cations and data communications. The two, once treated as
unique and separate entities, are by and large becoming
undifferentiable. A good example of this is the Federal
Communication Commissions Computer II decision. In essence,
due to the difficulty of distinguishing between telecommuni-
cations (which comes under FCC regulatory status) and data
processing/communications (which is not under FCC control)
the "commission gave up trying to classify various services
and types of equipment as belonging to one or the other"
[Ref. 22: p. 202]. The trend to merge the two is being
carried forward by many large corporations. Chase Manhattan
Bank, for instance, has been reported as planning to inte-
grate voice, data, and video on its cable system in the New
York City area [Eef- 22: p. 200]- The use of dedicated data
communication lines affords a much easier method of managing
data ccmaunica tions cost , but, many believe it to be much
more cost effective tc combine their telecommunications and
data communications. The proliferation of MODEMS in the
workplace is just one example of the trend toward making
data communication as simple as picking up a telephone.
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Because of the difficulty in separating the two, many
organizations choose net to try. For example, a review of
several Information System Support Plan (I5SP) documents
submitted to NAVDAC from major activities for FY 1S83-1S99
indicated numerous ambitious plans in progress or on the
drawing board for the development of networking projects.
Some of the ISSPs broke out teleprocessing cost, most
however did not. It would seem that the trend is to leave
the development of the data communications to support these
networks up to the contractor (at a price) and then to allow
the cost of operating, at least in part (dial-up) , the data
communications to be dissolved into the telephone bill. The
philosophy in this case would seem to be - if you can't find
it, then it must not exist and if it doesn't exist, then you
don't have to manage it.
It seems obvious from the direction, discussed previ-
ously, given by OME, the plans detailed in various ISSP
documents and general business trends that networks, office
automation, etc. are directions of importance to the Navy
and to Navy ADP specifically. As observed by a National
Academy of Science report the reasons -are straightforward,
"In many possible AEP applications areas, existing word
processing equipment, with its versatile interactive
editing capability, could be employed as a front end
data preparation subsystem; adding processing and commu-
nicating capabilities to such equipment greatly improves
its usefulness at modest incremental cost" [Eef. 23:
p. 13].
Should an organization really be concerned with the cost
or structuring of these new technologies? Some common sense
and several sources say - yes! By and large any network will
at seme point be facing the effects of the AT&T divestiture
and its accompanying change in rate structures. The effect
of this was reviewed in some detail in one trade magazine
which pointed out that,
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"The recent restructuring of the interstate private line
tariffs has created a cornucopia of options and propo-
sals tc sift through- The restructuring will have a
significant impact on the cost of multipoint-line data
networks, and cost increases of 35% or more are not
unusual. f' [Ref. 24: p. 113] ~
The article goes on to caution, "The rapidly changing envi-
ronment and the resultant uncertainty underline the need for
the ability to evaluate the cost of various options"
[Ref. 24: p. 113].
The "backbone" of the network is not the only cost envi-
ronment cf concern. For instance, Anthony Palerna of RCA
Cylix has predicted that the cost of leased private lines
(used to hook up the customer to the network backbone) will
increase "more than 90 percent at distances of less than JO
miles" [Ref. 22: p. 194]. The cost of supporting each node
in a multipoint network is also expected to rise signifi-
cantly. In fact some predict more than triple in the very
near future. [Ref. 22: p. 80]
It is safe to say at this point that data communications
is and should be a nanagement concern. It is an aspect of
design and of day tc day operations that deserves earnest
management attention. How the Navy chooses to manage new
technologies and the data communications associated with
them is the question cf the 80* s. However, before delving
too deeply into the future, the next section will review
briefly the current Navy policy and procedure in regards to
data communications services.
C. ACQUIRING COHHONICATION SERVICE
1 • Defense Data Network
a. Background
In the past the Navy has basically divided the
communications world into two parts - strictly telephone
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service, administered by Commander, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, and any other, administered by
Commander, Naval Telecommunications Command (COMNAVTELCOM) .
However, this distinction will no longer exist as of October
1, 1964 when all communications will come under
COMNA VTEICCM. Under the area of telecommunications in
support cf data communications it has further been divided
between communications in support of long-haul applications
and local data communications.
The military has for some time recognized the
advantages of developing and managing its own national data
network and the AUTCDIN II project was a study aimed at
designing a system towards that end. Concurrently, the
possible utilization cf the already functioning ARPANET was
being considered as another alternative. In a Deputy
Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 2 April 1982, AOTODIN
II was terminated and the military departments and the
Defense Communications Agency were tasked to develop a
Defense Data Network (DDN) . [Ref. 25] In that same April
memorandum the Deputy Secretary made it clear that the
application or use of the DDN was to be establishment-wide.
The memorandum specified that, "all data communication users
... be integrated into this common user network" [Ref. 26:
p-1]. This decision was emphasized again in March 1983 by
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
as the use of DDN was directed for support of, "all DoD ADP
systems and data networks requiring data communications
services" [Ref. 26: p. 1 ]. In January 1983 the Chief of
Naval Operations reguested that COMNAVTELCOM , "....assume
overall project coordination responsibility to plan, program
and manage implementation of DDN in the Navy" [Ref. 25].
The CNC letter also reguested that "COMNAVDAC and
COMNAVELEXSYCOM provide technical support for DDN develop-
ment as required by the Project Coordinator" [Ref. 25].
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t. DDN System Waivers
The Chief of Naval Operations, in March 1984,
stated that, "Long -haul and area communications, intercon-
nectivity, and the capability for interoperability will be
provided by the DDN" [Ref. 27]. The same instruction also
directed all ships and stations to ensure that their system
requirements had been submitted to COMNAVTELCOM for inclu-
sion in the DDN Users Requirements Data Base (UEDB) and
that, if net already utilizing the DDN, "an application for
temporary or permanent waiver has been submitted to
CNO(OF-941) via CCMNA VTELCOM, copy to DCA(B610) and
COMNAvEAC(Code 32)" [Eef. 27].
Although waivers for the mandate to use DDN can
be obtained, it is intentionally very hard to support. As
stated in an August 1983 Secretary of Defense message, "The
only request for waiver which will be considered are those
which clearly show that the DDN cannot meet the user
requirement" [Ref. 28]. The process for acquiring such a
waiver is shown in Figure 5.
1
c. The TSR Process
The vehicle for gaining tleecommunica tions lines
is the Telecommunications Service Request (TSR) . Detailed
instructions are contained in several references, including
NAVTE1CCMINSTR 2880. 1E and the Navy Planning Guidence for
Defense Data Network Implementation, also produced by
COMNAVTELCOM in March 1984. A block diagram description of
the process is shown in Figure 5.2 A message request for
telecommunication service (known as a Feeder TSR) initiates
the process and contains, "....detailed technical informa-
tion concerning circuits required, locations of all service
required and a schedule for start of service" [Ref. 26:
p. 18]. The Feeder 1SR is submitted to COMNAVTELCOM who
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Figure 5.1 DDN Waiver Process.
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Figure 5.2 Telecommunication Service Request Process.
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ensures that 1) the system referred to is contained in the
URDB and that 2) if the service requested is for other than
DDN connectivity, it has a waiver numter already approved
and assigned to it. Upon completion of the review a T SR is
forwarded to DCA for review and issuance of a telecommunica-
tion service order to acquire the necessary circuits.
d. DDN Funding
The DDN is supported by the Communications
Service Industrial Fund (CSIF) and the Navy provides monies
to the CSIF to support the use of the DDN by Navy subscri-
bers. The programming and funding responsibilities, as
broken down within the Navy, are outlined in the Navy
Planning Guide for EEN Implementation. They are listed as
follows: [Bef. 26: p.A-1
]
1 . CNO
Provide funds to the CSIF to
be used by DCA for tackbone
operations and acquisition of
network components, crypto
devices, backbone trunks,
access lines and MODEKs,
development of "standard"




Programming and funding to
implement the DDN program
within the Navy, which




Proyram and fund site prepara-








tion; interface software main-
tenance; interface hardware
maintenance; software acquisi-




It should be noted that the actual hook-up is at
no cost to the subscriber, as the DDN Project Management
Office will provide access lines from hosts and teruinals to
the DDN equipment. Also, for the moment, use of the DDK is
at no charge to the user. However, cost chargeback algo-
rithms are under study and, as indicated above, once settled
upon users can expect to pay a utilization rate for the use
of the DDN network.
2- local Area Data Communications
Although no hard, fast rules exist that separates
"long-haul" from "short-haul" (or Local Area) data communi-
cations, 20 miles seems to be brought up as a rough stan-
dard. The OPNAV instruction on Navy policy in regards to DDN
provides one reference to the "20 mile limit". It states,
"As a rule of thumb, if a dedicated line/terminal
requires. a "long-distance" link to. access a host system
(ie.
t
distance greater than 20 miles, or outside cf a
host's lccal metropolitan calling area), it is a candi-
date for direct connection to DDN" [Ref. 27].
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Communications aspects of a large, application-oriented
system is approved and managed as part of that major system
under the Life Cycle Management concept. But the guestion
that comes to mind is, "What about nonapplicat ion-oriented
LANs?". Conversations with NAVDAC, code 30, indicate that
this is an area of some concern as there is no current
instruction setting standard procedures or a centralized
review and approval in regards to this emerging area.
At present, if a command on a base wants to install
office automation or tie together various offices within a
building, it is generally a decision and funding requirement
left up to that local command. If the decision deals with
tying together various (and already existing) computers/
terminals spread out en a base, it is one that is to be made
by the base commander and perhaps the individual major clai-
mants involved. Even if a command wants to hook into an
already existing commercial LAN (say within a large metro-
politan area) there is no set instruction to deal with stan-
dards of review or approval. The final decision, in regards
to stand alone LANs, has been basically laid in the lap of
the entity that is gcing to pay for it. This is net neces-
sarily bad but it dees leave room for the introduction of
significant problems. In many cases, due to a lack of
onboard expertise in such areas and being unsure if any
centralized Navy expertise exist, the tendency may be to
just call upon the vendor. If the vendor has a good presen-
tation, builds up what seems like definite needs and offers
what appears to be the "perfect" solutions to fill those
needs, the Navy client will many times give the go ahead.
The problems lie in the fact that the same lack of expertise
in these rapidly changing technologies is the same lack of
expertise that may make the Navy client too dependent on the
vendor's evaluation cf requirements, problem identification
and technological sclution. The result may be less than
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optimal, both from the standpoint of the user/client and the
Navy as a whole.
The idea of helping Navy units and organizations in
such areas as: defining data communications needs, evalu-
ating data communications problems, selecting current solu-
tions from current technology, reviewing vendor supplied
analysis and solution proposals, etc. is a central focus of
this thesis and is discussed at length in the foilcwing
chapters.
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VI. MANAG EMENT ISSUES
A. DATA COMMUNICATIONS - SERVICE OR RESOURCE?
The question asked in the heading of this section is a
central element in the management of an information system.
The decision on the classification of data communications is
one that will define the boundaries of the system tc be
managed under the heading of Information Resource
Management. The question is really one that runs deeper than
just a dictionary definition because the classification also
affects the prevailing management attitude toward data
communications and as such can affect the entire management
structure.
Is data communications a service or a resource? The
answer may vary from person to person and from organization
to organization. In most, if not all, cases the individual
answer is closely related to their attitude toward IE 1! in
general. If the organization treats data processing and the
information it produces as a service to support other func-
tions, then they are most likely to see data communications
as just ancther service. If, on the other hand, the organi-
zation has adopted the currently popular view of informa-
tion as a corporate resource and asset then it is also more
likely to treat data communications as something other than
a service. Many organizations are developing an attitude
that treats informaticn as a resource and the organization's
ability to produce, disseminate, and control information is
considered an executive responsibility of some elevated
status. Given this attitude it seems to be a logical exten-
sion that the ability to transfer information - data commu-
nications - must also be treated as a resource to be
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planned, developed and managed within the organization's IRM
structure.
Just as there is not an across the board acceptance of
the IBM concept, the labeling of data communications is
equally as diverse. Even in academic studies, as was noted
by author Victor Fuchs, "Some studies include transporta-
tion, communications, and public utilities in the Service
sector; ethers exclude these" £Ref. 29: p. 14]. The differ-
ence, as to whether one labels data communications as a
resource or service, may seem like a minor point to some.
Eut it should be noted that many times the label something
carries can have a definite effect on how it is treated.
Ey and large a service tends to be managed by a rea ctive
management style and a resource or asset managed by a p roac-
tive management style. A reactive management style takes a
more narrow view of the role of the entity that is the
service. The service exists, waits to be called upon, and
then reacts to that call to provide the amount of service
requested. Certainly this is not to say that there is no
management taking place in this environment. Costs are moni-
tored, efforts to predict future demand may or may net be
taking place, if the effort is being made the estimate is
usually based on a review of historical data. Also, once
called upon, the application of the service up to the level
requested may be managed to seme extent to try and ensure
efficiency and effectiveness in regards to application tech-
niques. Still the prevailing attitude is one of - when
called upon, react. The private telephone system may be used
to illustrate this point. The telephone company will install
one or more telephones at a residence after a call is placed
indicating that telephone service is desired. They are reac-
tive to the call for service. While they may have estimates
for a general demand pattern, they do not have estimates for
a specific house. Kor do they just show up at your door
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step to say, "Let us estimate for you how many telephones
you really need to be efficient and cost effective, given
your specific needs." They really do not concern themselves
with the efficiency cf a specific residential set-up (in
regards to user needs) , as long as they receive what they
charge on a monthly usage basis.
Proactive management, on the other hand, carries with it
the ccnnotation of a different set of attitudes and manage-
ment style. Under this style the manager treats the entity
as a resource or asset to be applied aggressively as well as
efficiently and effectively. The manager is fully aware of
the organization's goals and objectives and sees the job as
that of actively seeking out ways to use the resource in a
manner that will facilitate the achievement of the organiza-
tion's goals. The manager must seek out opportunities to
utilize the resource, not sit back and wait for opportunity
to come to his door. The manager must go to the user, work
to understand the user's needs, help define real need as
opposed to perceived need and view the user's needs in the
context cf the more bread organizational needs. Once that is
accomplished the manager's expertise can then be used to
best match current technology to user need.
The issue then of the defining of data communications as
a resource or as a service is far from trivial as it deter-
mines how it will be managed and in the long term its
usefulness to the organization. The answer to the question,
"Is data communicatiens a service or a resource?" is really
to be found in the attitude of the organization toward
information management in general. Since data communicatiens
is really the transfer or flew of information it seems
reasonable that one can not really be separated from the
other. As observed by consultant James Morgan,
Telecommunications is generally melting into MlS/dp and
office automation. Joining telecommunications and data
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>rocessing is no longer a bold steo. It's the common
.hing to do. [Ref. 22: p. 218]
Major corporations have also adopted this view in their
planning for future direction. In his book dealing with the
inner workings of IBM, author Rex Malik noted that back in
the mid 1970's IBM products were, "....predicated on the
notion that communications and computing are now inextri-
cably intertwined" [Ref. 30: p. 443].
The labeling of data communications as a resource cr as
a service is an issue to be settled by each organization. It
must however, be addressed with full awareness of the
current trends in technology, of the connotation connected
with the respective labels, and of the relative importance
within the organization of information management tc the
long terra success of the organization.
B. IEH
The Information Resource Management (IRM) framework was
discussed at some length in Chapter II of this thesis ani
this section will amount to supplementary remarks. IBM is
defined in as many ways as there are authors who have
written about the subject. It seems however, that one common
denominator among the definitions is the idea that organiza-
tions need to take control and manage the entire information
environment (under their control) as a whole. To do other-
wise would seem to invite confusion, inefficiencies and
lower overall effectiveness. The management focus is on the
entire information system not just on its separate parts. In
the authors' opinion that system is a means of collecting,
recording, storing, processing and communicating information
to satisfy the requirements and processes of all users. It
seems that article after article and book after book stress
the fact that the three key areas of data processing, office
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automation and telecommunications are converging into one
broader area of "information processing". A recent book by
James Cash, Warren KcFarlan and James McKenny stresses on
several occasions this merging of technologies with state-
ments such as, "Rather, the technologies of computing, tele-
communications and office automation must be thought of as
providing, in aggregate, a common cluster of policies and
management focus" [ Ref . 31: p. 28]. The authors go on to
express two of the najor reasons why they believe these
technologies must be managed as a single entity.
The first is the enormous level of physical interconnec-
tions which increasingly must take place between the
three technologies. The second major reason is that,
todav, execution of projects utilizing any one of these
technologies poses very similar management problems.
[Ref. 31: p. 281
The title "Information Resource Management" carries
somewhat misleading connotations. An organization can not
really manage "information". It can not manage it because
information, in the purest sense, is not a physical entity.
Information is a mental perception and its transmission is
by electrical impulses. What can be managed however, are the
people, equipment, document flow, electronic data flow
routes and the management structure involved in the informa-
tion process. Another very important issue then becomes the
management structure associated with the elements, just
mentioned, that constitute the information resource struc-
ture. Since this issue alone could provide an ample topic
for further study, the focus here will be confined to the
element of data communications and the new technologies of
IAN, office automation, etc.
Should data communications be managed separately from
data processing? As with all issues there does not exist a
100% consensus on the answer, but, the trend may very well
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be as expressed fcy Cash, McFarlan, and McKenny,
"Increasingly, the trend is tc merge voice and data communi-
cations policy and operations in a single department, typi-
cally located within the D? department" [ Ref . 31: p. 77].
These authors follow this statement with what they believe
to be an example of the benefit of such an organizational
shift,
For example, a large bank recently installed a system to
manage voice and data traffic by controlling switches
and line utilization. The system reduced their communi-
cations bill by 35$, with improved service to both the
data processing effort and voice communications.
[Ref. 31: p. 77]
It seems clear that the answer to the issue of whether
data communications and data processing should remain sepa-
rated is tending toward the view of integrated technologies
and integrated management of those technologies. Tnis
opinion has been expressed by many including the National
Academy of Science, "A far greater potential exists for
improving the overall management and command-decision
process of the Navy through a fuller use of an information
system, more broadly defined" [Ref. 23: p. 15]. Cash,
McFarlan, and McKenny also express this sentiment in
addressing the area cf planning,
The planning process must be considerably broader in the
range of technolcgies it covers than just data
?rocessing. It must deal with the technologies of elec-
ronic communica ticnss, data processing, office automa-
tion, stand-alone minis, and so forth, both separately
and in an integrated fashion. [Ref. 31: p. 232]
Much of this trend toward integrated management is being
dictated by the increasing popularity of such technologies
as office automation, networking, voice/data integrated
circuits, etc. Office automation, for example, is no longer
regarded as just a couple of word processors sitting on
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desks. It is actually the coupling of word processors with
communications and data base technologies, electronic mail,
and others that really provide the potential for increased
efficiency and effectiveness in the organization. Civilian
industry has, by and large, moved in the direction of
considering data communications and data processing as
pieces of the same technological management pie. A recent
survey ncted that, "Three quarters of the nearly 1600 survey
respondents said data communications responsibility rests
with MIS/DP" [Kef. 32: p. 28]. The issue of separating data
communications from data processing may be one that is
answered by the continued evolution of new technologies,
tut, at the present it is still one for today's management
to review and decide upon. The insightful will do so with an
eye toward the future.
C. INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
The introduction of new technology is an occurrence that
every organization must face. The frequency of that occur-
rence varies from organization to organization, but, the
introduction of new technology can not te avoided forever if
the organization is tc maintain any kind of acceptable level
of efficiency and effectiveness. The issue at hand then is
the "best" way of identifying, evaluating, incorporating,
and operating new technologies within the framework of the
organization. The managing of the introduction of new tech-
nologies is a complicated and time consuming affair that is
fraught with potential problems in both technical and organ-
izational areas. The proper management of such an evolution
is of significant importance to the organization and worthy
cf higher management concern.
Several issues are contained in the paragraph atove.
These include:
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1. Should an organization expend funds into R&D to
develop new technology or should the organization be
satisfied with utilizing advances made by others?
2. Who will be tasked to keep up with the emerging of
advances?
3. Who will evaluate organizational needs in the areas
affected by emerging technologies?
4. Who will match new technology capabilities to organi-
zational needs?
The above is not an inclusive list, but shoull make it clear
that this is not an area to be taken lightly.
The first question to be addressed deals with the deci-
sion to invent new technologies or to utilize those invented
by others. Obviously to get into the inventing cycle will,
in most cases, mean large investments in funds and for most
user organizations this is just not feasible and not ic line
with their basic business goals. The more reasonable
approach for most is to evaluate new technology as it
emerges and to adapt only those that fit the needs of the
organization.
Computers and data communications are rapidly advancing,
technical fields. As pointed out by Cash, McFarlan, and
McKenny, "There is no need for a firm to adopt leading-edge
technology (indeed, many are ill-equipped to do so) , but it
is inexcusable not to be aware of what the possibilities
are" [Eef. 31: p. 12]. In fact William F. Synnott, author
and Senior Vice President for Information Systems anil
Services Div, Bank of Boston, believes that, "keeping up
with and using and controlling, such quantum leaps in tech-
nology represents the major challenge facing information
systems managers in this decade" [Ref. 33: p. 104]. Keeping
up with technological advances is important and time
consuming. In facing the problem the answer becomes a
management/organizational issue. Nonetheless, the decision
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must be made as to what organizational unit/function will be
assigned that responsibility. Should each unit within the
organization be responsible for keeping up with advances or
should a more centralized approach be taken? As inferred
from the previous quote, Synnott feels that meeting the
challenge of evaluating the possible applications of
advancing technologies falls within the realm of the infor-
mation system manager's area of responsibility. Synnott
describes what he feels are three aspects to meeting the
challenge. These include: [Ref. 33; p. 104]
1. Creation of "layered 1 ' architectures which will inte-
grate all computer and information resource systems
within each organization;
2. Connection of all elements of the layered information
systems by means of a centrally designed and
controlled corporate communications system;
3. Differentiating between corporate data bases and the
various ones required by organizational units, while
at the same time supporting transfers of information
between the twc types of data bases.
Cash, McFarlan , and KcKenny also firmly place the
responsibility for awareness and evaluation of new technolo-
gies in the hands of the Information Systems Manager and
explain their reasons as,
Appropriately staffed, an important part of its
TlnformaTion System Management) mission is to scan
leading-edge technologies and make sure that the organi-
zation is aware of their existence. It represents a
critical mass, responsible for conveying knowledge of
the existence of this technology, and of how to use it,
to appropriate clusters of potential users. By virtue of
its central location it can conceive where potential
interconnection between the needs of different user
groups exist and it can help to facilitate their connec-
tion. [Bef. 31: p. 36]
The above are two opinions representing one side of the
issue, ethers may feel that individual units within their
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organizations have the expertise (and time) within each unit
that is capable of keeping abreast of and evaluating new
technologies. As is the case so often the answer may be
organization dependent.
The last guote in the preceding paragraph leads into
other connected issues - staffing, evaluating new technolo-
gies in terms of user's needs, and the evaluating of user's
needs in the first place - that must be addressed in terms
of where responsibility will be placed. Generally speaking
new technologies are introduced into an organization with
the idea that by doing so it will permit the organization to
handle increased volumes of work or provide new or improved
services or increase managerial effectiveness or possibly
all three. The goal of managing this introduction of new
technology is simply to enable the organization to better
use current technology and to improve the integration of
that technology into the organization. To keep abreast of
and evaluate new technologies takes an investment - time.
The new technologies must be examined as to what services
they produce, who the potential users are, and what degree
of success and satisfaction can be expected from the
service.
It would seem that this evaluation could take place at
one of two levels within the organization. The function
could either be centralized or assigned as a responsibility
of each organizational unit. The discussion now relates to
that found in Chapter II, section D, if the responsibility
is assigned to each unit to do, then there is a cost to the
unit associated with that decision. As has been stressed, to
keep up with and to evaluate emerging technologies takes an
investment of time and expertise on the part of the organi-
zational unit performing the function. In order to perform
this new function each unit would either have to hire the
expertise (at a cost) or draw from its present staff
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(assuming the expertise required was already present in the
unit) which detracts from the function which they were
previously performing (cost of opportunities foregone). The
possibility also exists that because of the unit's limited
view of the organization its evaluation selections and
implementations may be short range answers to narrowly
defined problems. flhile in the immediate best interest of
the unit concerned, the decision may not be in the long term
test interest of the organization as a whole.
The second option then is to utilize a central pool of
expertise which would be tasked with reviewing and evalu-
ating new technologies and possible applications of these
technologies within the organization. In an organization
which utilizes IBM concepts the pool, placed within the IBM
division, would be at a level in the organization which
allowed them to be aware of the strategic goals of the
organization and evaluate new technologies accordingly. The
team cf experts must be able to understand the goals and
then evaluate new technologies in the context cf their
potential contribution to reaching objectives that will make
the organization's long term goals achieveable. As empha-
sized in the quote from Cash, McFarlan, and McKenny (printed
earlier in this secticn) the key is "appropriately staffed"
and to add staff incurs a cost. The question would then be
how best to maximize the return for the cost incurred. To
staff such a function centrally, as opposed to staffing each
individual unit, would seem to provide some economy of
scale. Also, if a central pool (due to time available to
apply to the task, or a higher level or expertise, or
through tenefits derived from shared knowledge, etc.) can
provide better decisions on choosing and integrating new
technologies then the cost of additional staffing may be
offset by organization-wide benefits derived from those
decisions. It may be worth remembering that in the area of
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choosirg and applying new technologies, excessive conserva-
tism can result in missed benefits and unrealized cost
reductions. On the other hand, uninformed or premature
attempts to utilize new technolcgies can result in rather
expensive disasters. The question or issue to be decided is
at what level in the organization to place that responsi-
bility so as to best avoid the above extreme consequences.
Of course, a third option is to allow units to individu-
ally contract out for outside consulting and industry repre-
sentatives to come in and identify user needs and the
appropriate technologies to meet those needs. The advan-
tages, from the user's viewpoint, may be a sense of control
in that the unit can pick the who and the when cf the
consulting service. The unit may also feel that the recom-
mendations will be more tailored to its specific needs since
the outside consulting service will be concerned with only
that units needs and not with any broader view of the entire
organization.
The broader view of this issue addresses the ccncern
that the unit's judgement may become based on perceived
needs vice real needs. Thus they may be influenced into
believing that what the industry happens to want to sell is
what they need. The costly result being that the unit ends
up with what exactly what it asked for - not what it needed.
Also, lost is the opportunity to build a corporate knowledge
cf problems matched with solutions that could be transferred
or utilized from one unit to the next. This theme was voiced
by Edwin Odisho, a senior system analyst at NASA's John F.
Kennedy Space Center, when suggesting the advantages of
borrowing on the experience of others, "If I have one piece
of advice, it's to find someone else who has had the same
kind of problems you have, but is a little bit ahead of
where you are" [Bef. 34: p. 84]. Put in different terms, the
danger of individual units inventing the wheel is not only
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the wasted cost of reinventing the same wheel, but also the
possibility that they will all come up with the same s quare
wheel.
D. TECHNOLOGY TEAH
1- Internal vs. External
Among the issues discussed in the previous section
was the one concerning the staffing of individual units
within the organization with sufficient technology expertise
to keep up with and evaluate new technologies versus
staffirg in a more centralized manner to perform that func-
tion. For the purpose of the discussion to follow the exper-
tise pool will be referred to as the "technology team". Also
briefly mentioned was the the option of using contracted
consultants to perform this same function. These issues will
be discussed in still further detail in this section.
The first question to be considered is why any
organization or unit within an organization would go outside
of its internal resources and make use of external sources.
The reasons can of course vary, but author Harry I.
Greenfield provides, as one possible set of factors that
influence an organization in such a decision, the following:
[Ref. 35: pp. 37-39]
1. The desire tc produce (a product or service) at a
lower cost through contracting out, due to economies
of scale;
2. Desire to increase quantity of output by making use
of a contractor firm's (or any organization outside
the boundaries of the unit level in question)
personnel, which are needed on a full time basis,
rather than than by expanding the basic producing
organization; and
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3. Need to tap the expertise of specialist who can keep
the firm abreast of technology, assist in updating,
minimize risk and provide guidance in respect tc the
firm's growth.
If the decision is made to perform the function at
the individual basis, but without adding to the staffing
level of the units, then the process of deciding what to
give up must take place. The reader is referred to Chapter
II, section D, for a detailed description of what is
involved in such a process. If the decision is made to
centralize the function and utilize a technology team at a
more corporate level, then another possible issue arises.
The issue can be phrased as, "Should the user unit be
required to use the parent organization's team or should it
be allowed to choose between that team or consultants from
outside the organization?"
For the parent organization to provide an additional
service involves a cost to the organization. That cost can
either be absorbed, in an accounting sense, as overhead or
charged on an as used basis to those units of the organiza-
tion that use the service. Costing schemes and algorithms
can be very complicated and possibly unique to the partic-
ular organization and service in question and is not the
focus of this discussion. In general however, if a charge
system is to be used the organization will want to at least
recover the cost of providing the additional service. A
detailed discussion of this, as it relates to the IEH frame-
work, can be found in Chapter II, section C. One side of the
issue raised here is that if the potential user of the
service is allowed the freedom of choosing between the
organization's Technology Team or a similar service avail-
able outside the orgar.ization and if the user knows the cost
to be charged by each, the user can (as discussed in Chapter
II, section D) make the decision based on least cost for
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similar services. The result will be good for the user in
that there is a cost savings for the unit and may or may not
te advantageous to the organization as a whole.
Cn the other hand, if the user is required to use
the organization's Technology Team, the cost to the user may
or may not be greater but the organization as a whole may
derive greater benefit. The reasons being that by requiring
units to use the organization's Technology Team the opportu-
nity for growth in the expertise and corporate knowledge is
increased with the result that it may add to the effective-
ness and efficiency cf the team. Also the advantage of tech-
nology transfer across the organization, of solutions more
attuned to organizational needs and in concert with the
organization's long term goals and strategies can be
attained. The cauticn here however, is that the fact that
the user is limited to using only the organization's team's
service takes away the incentive for efficiency that usually
is present in a competitive situation, such as the one
described in the previous paragraph. Therefore, the organi-
zation must substitute other measures that will ensure the
need for efficiency is not lost.
2 • 2h§ Organization Technology Team
If an Organization Technology Team is to be formed
it must be done with a goal of providing quality service,
and the right service, at a minimal price. Ian Angus has
suggested considerations for users to be aware of when
reviewing proposals provided by telecommunications consult-
ants that could act as well as a check list for a Technology
Team to evaluate its own standards. Angus mentions the
following areas of considerations: [Ref. 36: p. 69 ]
1. Consultants understanding of the users requirements.
2. Technical experience level of consultant.
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3. Pragmatic approach - does the consultant apply appro-
priate technology to the problems or does he attempt




6. Concern for detail.
7. Current knowledge of technology.
8. Relative consulting staff size.
The question of the size and make-up of such a team
is also a valid one and the answer is closely tied to the
organization itself. Belated questions also include, "Is the
team to function in a reactive or proactive style (as
defined in section A of this chapter)?" and "What is the
scope cf potential clients?" If the team is reactive then r
at least initially, the demand may not be of any great level
and a large staff would be underutilized. If the scope of
potential clients is to be held small then both the demand
would be expected to be lessened and the potential techno-
logical applications could be narrowed and expertise in
fewer fields would be required to be staffed. On the ether
hand, the team and the service they are to provide is to be
treated as a resource. Then, if it is to be applied
organization-wide and in a manner that maximizes the poten-
tial effectiveness and efficiencies offered by new technolo-
gies, a proactive style is more likely and a broader
foundation of technological expertise is required. The team
may actively seek tc identify data communications problems
rather than wait for users, who may or may not be in a posi-
tion tc even recognize the scope of the problems or of the
potential value to be gained from technologies that are
properly applied.
lastly, organizational change, whether to accommo-
date the forming cf a new functional unit like a
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Technological Team or redefining organizational responsibil-
ities in acknowledgement of technological trends (ie.
merging of the telecommunications, data communications, and
data processing fields) always faces some resistance and is
never to be done without due consideration. One may however,
wish to consider the following points made about a
successful giant in the computer field, "As the narket
changes, so IBM will change the organization as well as the
lines of responsibility and communications" [Eef. 30:
p. 257]. Also,
If there is a trick to IBM, it lies in its belief in
structure and its ability, almost reflex, to allot one
man cr however many men are required to look after any
task at hand and dc so quickly once management has so
decided. [fief. 30: p. 273]
It should be remembered that to change for the sake of
change is wasteful, but to change in recognition of the
present as it stands and in preparation of the future as it
is perceived is management's duty.
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VII. ANALYSIS £j,o RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
A frequently articulated justification for studying
history is that it repeats itself and lessons can te learned
to preclude previous disasters, fiascoes, and mistakes. This
idea seems to have equal validity and application in the
ADP/data communications arena. For this reason, the under-
lying theme of the authors' analysis is focused on the past
and the lessons that can be derived from it. In contrast,
the recommendations are presented with a view towards
preventing the recurrence of similar mistakes in the future.
B. ANALYSIS
The question of whether data communications is a service
or a resource seems tc be fundamental to whether or not IRM
philosophy is to be adopted by an organization for managing
data communications. The answer will have profound impact on
the management actions and perceptions. If data communica-
tion is treated as a service, an examination of history
suggests that a reactive management style, as noted in
chapter VI, will prevail. The implication of this style is
that cf a "big bang" approach. In other words, a "wait and
see" attitude is dcninant and this often leads to the
reasoning that all can be made better in one fell swocp by
means of a single plan; a panacea. This cannot possibly work
in the ADP environment as demonstrated by past failures.
Clearly, the lessons learned from the short life span of ADP
could not have been forgotten. The concept of evolutionary
development in the AEP environment should now have a strong
foothold in the minds of system managers. Evolutionary
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development is associated with a proactive management
philosophy. What this entails is a framework for growth.
Specifically, what is needed, as James Martin states, is
.... not an all-embracing, grandiose plan but a frame-
work which will permit step-by-step growth, each step
suitably small. The separate steps should fit intc an
overall framework so as to have whatever degree of capa-
bility and interccnnectability is beneficial to the
corporation as a whole, now and in the future.
[Eef. 11]
In essence, flexible planning and in particular strategic
planning is paramount. With consideration towards preventing
recurrence of past nistakes, data communications must be
treated as a resource, in the authors* view. By doing so,
IRM philosophy can provide the framework for data communica-
tions irariagement.
As stated in an earlier chapter, "information" cannot be
managed in the sense that it is not a physical object or
thing. Bather, information resource management entails the
management of the people, equipment, facilities, procedures,
structure, and other related objects involved in the flew or
process cf providing information. From Chapter II it was
learned that basic incentives, rewards, and penalties are
essential for managing the various system components by
Central Management. Unfortunately, within the Navy, direc-
tion (incentives, rewards, and penalties) for data communi-
cations originates from an entirely different source than
that which provides direction for information systems. It
was previously noted that COMNAVTELCOM will soon have
cverall responsibility for all communications (both data and
voice) while COMNAVDAC provides central management for ADP
matters. Organizationally both report to the same CPNAV
code. Operationally, each has its own separate management
styles, influences, and requirements. In contrast, private
organizations have more closely aligned data communications
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and AEP ty merging pclicy and operation aspects of the two
in a single organizational entity, typically within the DP
section. This is further supported by industry surveys
{Chapter VI, Section E) which note that the majority cf ADP
data communications managers believe data communications
responsibility rests with the DP community. For example, at
tf. R. Grace, a diversified $6.2 billion multinational firm
that operates in 47 states and 43 foreign countries and one
of the world's largest companies, there is one director for
both voice and data communications - Robert Norian. Within
the company there are a heterogeneous collection of
networks, "pockets" cf networks, that serve the company's
largely autonomous divisions. On the question of the prob-
lems he faced with a stronger data background than voice,
Norian stated:
It was a plus because as the technology of switching
systems moved from electromechanical design toward
computer driven design,, it was a natural evolutionary
step. Therefore. the jargon, the understanding of how
these things worked was a natural step. It was a comfor-
table transition.
I suspect that the reverse would probably be a little
more difficult for people, and I have seen that. It is a
little more difficult for traditional voice people to
move into the data sphere. [Ref. 37]
In keeping with the authors' theme, history seems to
favor DP leadership as the most logical choice for managing
data communications. As noted at tf.R. Grace, the trends in
private industry support this because the DP staff was
forced to learn about telecommunications before telecommuni-
cations personnel became involved in DP. Additionally, the
DP community has been exposed to life cycle management
requirements with the attendant capital investments.
Finally, if a classification of DP managers in the aggre-
grate can be made, it is the authors' opinion that they
would be closer to proactive than the classification of
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telecommunications managers. In all fairness to NAVTE1CCM,
corporations in industry generally do not have structures
comparable to the Navy's. In other words, separate telecom-
munications managers within corporate organizations do not
exist. Therefore, ADP staffs were forced to accept data
communications responsibilities. Consequently/ the Navy's
situation is unigue. Still, lessons learned can te applied
in a general sense. Mere specific, the new NAVTELCOM organi-
zation which will be effective 1 October 1984 seems to lend
itself to the kind of structure needed to manage data commu-
nications as does the current NAVDAC organization.
Noticeably absent from the NAVTELCOM organization, however,
is the provision for data communications specialists at each
of the regional divisions. This is imperative if NAVTELCOM
is to become the Central Manager of data communications.
Inasmuch as COMNAVTELCOM and COMNAVDAC are, in a sense,
type commanders of their respective services, each would
seem to have valid reasons to assume overall management of
data communications services within the Navy. With both
organizations reporting to the same OPNAV code, it would
seem mere appropriate to implement a steering committee or
information systems beard comprising members of both organi-
zations. The resolution of any problems can be accomplished
at the OP-94 level. In this way, a more coordinated effort
could be applied to the assessment of costs and benefits
associated with decisions on the entire spectrum of informa-
tion resource manageient (including data communications).
Whether NAVDAC or NAVTELCOM should be the Central
Manager of data communications cannot be resolved at the
authors' level. Irrespective, something must be done to
ensure that management does not lag the rapidly changing
technology. One way is to develop a workable strategy that
can be applied independent of the technology. As the
arteries of informations systems, data communications affect
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virtually every component in the system and therefore virtu-
ally every decision regarding its management. Long range
planning in this area, therefore, must consider various
dimensions. These dimensions are basically: the setting of
standards, the selection of architectures, the selection of
hardvare/software, usage decisions, the design of the data,
and application development. Moreover, these dimensions must
be considered from the aspect of control, i.e., centraliza-
tion, decentralization, mixture of centralization and decen-
tralization, or strong cooperation between central
management and the decentralized components.
Without any reservations, standards must be set at a
highly centralized level to ensure uniformity throughout the
organization. In addition, the selection of computer network
architecture must be strongly centralized to ensure future
compatibility and growth. Both data design and hardware/
software selection reguires close working relations between
central management and the decentralized users. Osage deci-
sions and application development are dimensions which can
be a mixture of centralization and decentralization. In
ether words, some usage decisions or applications develop-
ment can flow from the top down while others can be initi-
ated at the local level. [Ref. 11]
Armed with this overall strategy, the guestion cf hew to
deal with rapidly changing technology remains. In view of
the relative immaturity of network technology yet the
increasing acceptance of its utility, Central Management's
problems remain formidable. Because computer network tech-
nology is relatively immature, new innovations and implemen-
tations are constantly occurring. As wide spread acceptance
is achieved, concerns for the proliferation of incompatible
systems arise, particularly in view of longer range project-
ions for the need to have inter-network capabilities. The
introduction of new technology and the issues associated
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with it were discussed in detail in Chapter VI, Section C.
Fundamentally, the key issues referred to the determination
of organizational (user) needs and whether the evaluation
process to make this determination should be done internally
or externally and whether or not a central group should be
employed for this function.
From the outset, the object of the research was to find
cut what role NAVDAC should play in providing technical
advice/support to its Navy customers. Perhaps this focus
was too narrow and a broader perspective should have been
adopted. More realistically, the question can be rephrased
to "Who in the Navy should provide technical advice/support
to its data communications users?" It seems evident from
the arguments presented that a real need exists for this
service. Further, whoever becomes the appropriate instru-
ment for effecting telecommunications in support of AD?
applications, complete cradle to grave support must be
provided in a competitive fashion. By this, the authors
mean that the users should be free to select services from
competing sources (consultants, etc.) but with consideration
to life cycle aspects. The principal question of hew the
Navy should serve its data communications customers remain.
There are probably many ways including the establishment of
the previously mentioned steering committee (similar to a
corporate IS board) , and the implementation of survey teams.
The authors submit, however, that whichever way is chosen
all must first focus en sizing the problem. For this reason,
the following recommendations for a Technology Team as
discussed in Chapter VI seem appropriate. The composition of
the team is deliberately omitted since it is a subject which
requires even further study and it is within the prerogative




In order for individual units to approach any acceptable
level of effectiveness in applying new technologies to
present and anticipated data communications problems, they
must gain current and reliable information and direction. As
a result, the units must obtain information from vendors/
consultants or from expanding their individual staffs with
experts in the various emerging technologies. As discussed
in an earlier chapter, vendors can be inconsistent in their
applications and net concerned with broader organizational
concerns. Expanded staffs tend to be expensive, underuti-
lized and, when taken from the broader top down organiza-
tional view, redundant.
An executive level Technology Team (NAVDAC level) or
perhaps Technology Teams distributed at the regional sites
(slightly decentralized at the NARDACs or at NAVTELCOM
regional divisions) effers many advantages considering" the
relative immaturity of network technology, the rate of
change of ADP technology, and the current state of the Navy
in relation to state of the art technology. A Technology
Team at the NAVDAC/NAVTELCOM level could allow for focusing
on the strategic relevance of user's reguest for data commu-
nications services. The team could be responsible for plan-
ning and the organizational direction of data communications
by formulating the previously mentioned overall strategy for
data communications. This would also imply that the team
must be apprised of the Navy's organizational goals and
objectives. The team could be used to provide the central-
ized control for setting standards and for the selection of
network architecture. With regard to data design and
hardware/software selection, the team could provide the
strong coordination with users to ensure overall consistency
and compatibility. Any usage decisions or applications
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development emanating from the upper echelons (Central
Management) could be provided by this team.
Consistent with the theme of retaining flexibility in
strategic planning, i.e., it should not be a single gran-
diose plan, the Technology Team would proceed in small
incremental steps. First and foremost (after formation)
could be to size the data communications problem. This could
be accomplished for common or general problems existing
throughout the user community. Focus could then turn to
individual units within the organization for more specific
problems from the top down. These data communication surveys
could form the baseline for developing the overall strategic
plans which again would be subject to continuous change and
adjustment.
A basic tenet of design is that it is driven by organi-
zational needs. Whether or not a user component of the
organization elects tc use the Technology Team, the organi-
zational needs must not be discarded. Frequently, the
overall organization's needs are unimportant or unknown to a
unit component at a lew level. The Technology Team could be
employed to ensure that, requests are aligned with the
overall organization's needs. In the event a consultant is
used by a user component instead of the team to develop its
data communications requirements, the team could be used to
review the vendor's analysis or proposal. This review would
be performed to ensure consistency and compatibility, to
match technology with need, and to ensure relevance tc the
overall organization's needs. A Technology Team under the
auspices of the steering committee seems to be the most
logical and ideal implementation for providing the needed
data communications services to users. Therefore, the
authors strongly recommend that this approach be taken. Ihe
recurring question of who should be responsible for data
communications services again arises but in a different
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form. Tie question rev becomes one of where the team should
te located organizationally. Should the team be under
NAVDAC? NAVTELCOM? The steering committee? Moreover, the
more practical question of how the team should be funded
arises. The following paragraphs provide a solution to this
problem and uses the NAVDAC organization for implementation.
The same approach could be applied to the NAVTELCOM organi-
zation or to the steering committee as appropriate.
The competitive environment of ADP services caused by
the introduction of NIF funding makes the inplementaticn of
a Technology Team more difficult Within the NAVDAC organiza-
tion. To deal with this, the authors' recommend that the
team be mission funded for a specified period of time, for
example, two years after formation. Users would be free to
utilize consultants cr the organization's Technology Team.
In all likelihood, the users would take advantage of the
"free" service. This would benefit not only the user but
also the Technology Team. As noted previously, it is impor-
tant to build the corporate knowledge (history) and the
technology base. An introductory period would provide the
opprtunity for developing these two essential ingredients.
Additionally, an opportunity for establishing a good reputa-
tion for the team would be provided. Therefore, it would be
imperative that the team be staffed with professionals,
knowledgeable and able to deliver useful results. After the
period of mission funding, the Technology Team could be made
available on the "open market". In other words, the team
could be contracted out on a reimbursable basis for services
as required. This, of course, implies that by this time the
team must have refined its operations to the point that it
can provide a price competitive, quality service. There are
many potential benefits of the Technology Team concept. The
purpose here was to provide a skeletal introduction to stim-
ulate thought on hew to improve data communications services
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within the Navy. This concept or something similar needs to
be pursued in order to fill a need that was so clearly
articulated by the National Academy of Sciences regarding
the application of new technology to improve organizational
performance. The findings report:
Units at various levels within the Navy appear to have
no place to turn to receive good advice on how their
information systems might best be developed technically
or to receive appropriate guidance in making the tasx
changes that information systems require. The committee
believes that providing leadership, assistance, and
guidance in systems are functions tnat ought to be
readily available to almost every organizational unit
th<with e Navy,
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SOMHARY
Throughout this study, the authors sought to establish a
framework from which logical conclusions could be drawn and
meaningful recommendations could be made regarding the role
NAVDAC should play in the area of data communications. 3y
employing Information Resource Management philosophy founded
en economic considerations, it was hoped that conclusions
would leave little room for argument. The IRM system was
deliberately described at a low level in order to facilitate
reader understanding and so as to permit application at a
much higher level by abstraction. The high level in this
case, of course, would be Navy-wide or possibly DOD-wide.
By eguating Central Management to the OPNAV level,
OPNAV's role as the overall system manager and coordinator
of the organization's activities becomes more evident.
Similar equivalency is apparent when matching other organi-
zational components of the Navy with those described in the
IRM system (see 2. 1) . In this same vein, the concepts and
processes of decentralized planning, coordination, and
control within the IRM system seem to be directly applicable
to the Navy's organization. With respect to the decision-
making behavior of each of the IRM system components in
regard to such issues as capacity, technology, and product
mix, great similarity also exists when a comparison is made
between the IRM system and the Navy's structure. Although
the IRM decisionmaking process was illustrated by seeking
the solution to the capacity choice problem alone, the
process itself was the important aspect. The process is
equally as applicable to other decision problems including
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the technology choice problem and the product mix problem.
These decision problems are fundamentally no different than
those which exist at all levels within the Navy. Therefore
the IBM process for seeking their solutions would be appro-
priate for Navy use. Finally, without some form of structure
to the organization and the associate! incentives, rewards,
and penalties, the IBM system could not operate effectively.
Within the Navy there are commensurate forms of incentives,
rewards, and penalties as well as the needed structure.
From a user standpoint, the IRM system focused on
aspects cf costs and benefits given that Central Management
provided a given budget. Users within an IEM system would
balance costs (including opportunities forgone) with
benefits including intangible ones. The kinds of considera-
tions when confronted with the option to acquire a new
service was presented with various alternatives to arrive at
a satisfactory decision. Aspects of in-house versus buying
in the competitive market were discussed. In short, a brief
outline of the kinds of considerations which users must take
into account were provided. Clearly, these considerations
are egually as applicable from the Navy's perspective.
To establish that NAVDAC and its satellite agencies are
indeed confronted with the kinds of considerations present
in an IRM system, a brief overview of the NIF system within
NARDAC was provided. With the transition to NIF funding,
NAVDAC* s clients, the users, also become more involved in
the IRM kinds of considerations. Unfortunately, the buyer-
seller relationship between NAVDAC and its customers is more
complex than that which exists in a typical private sector
enterprise. As noted previously, one of the biggest differ-
ences results from the NIF imposed requirements for stabi-
lized rates. Stabilized rates provide for a measure of
predictability from the user's stand point. However, the
true costs for the services may not be evident since the
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charges are based on recoupment of previous years' gains or
losses. Although the situation may facilitate budgeting at
the user level, it conceals the actual costs and makes the
decisionmaking process for customer managers difficult. In
other words, customer managers must use the stabilized
charges fcr comparison purposes with the price of competing
services. Alternatively, a two or three year horizon must
be adopted in developing the actual costs to compare with
market prices. The administrative burden of adopting the
latter approach may be costlier than the benefit value to be
derived from it. Although it may be simpler to use the
stabilized rate charges for the economic considerations, it
also carries with it ether implications. In any given year,
the stabilized charges will most likely be less than or
greater than the prices from competing sources. Depending on
the year in which the service is acquired (most likely when
the charges are less than competitors), the following year's
charges could very possibly be higher than competitor's.
This poses a unique challenge to customer managers.
The vehicle for recoupment of the operating costs at
each of the NAEDACs is the chargeback system. Typically,
chargeback systems suffer from many unsatisfactory conse-
quences including complexity in the calculation of the
charges which user management may find difficult to inter-
pret. The NARDAC chargeback scheme seems to manifest similar
shortcomings. However, this is mitigated to an extent by
the stabilized rates.
In order to provide better foundation for discussion,
the next chapter focused primarily on the details of linking
computers. First of all, the reasons for linking computers
was presented. Basically, the reasons revolve around
harnessing data, processing power, applications, or any
computer resource in crder to make the resource conveniently
available to users in a completely transparent manner. Other
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reasons include tc increase system reliability, to
distribute processing power in a logical way, and to provide
economy and flexibility.
Closely related tc the reasons for linking computers are
the uses. These uses fall essentially under three principal
categories. The first category of computer network use
concerns access to processing power. The second involves
access tc data and the final category relates to employing
computer networks as a communications medium.
To illustrate the relative immaturity of computer
networks, seme of the ways to link computers were discussed.
Three different methods for linking computer hardware
(including peripherals) in a local network prevail and are
associated with different vendors. They are collision avoid-
ance and detection, token passing, and star. In the long
haul arena, a description of the method of connection used
in the DEN was described since it is the principal vehicle
for meeting DOD data communications needs.
From the overview of the reasons for, the uses of, and
the ways to link computers, the reader should have gained a
"feel" for the kinds of problems which information systems
managers at all levels must address. In a very general way,
these problems fall under the headings of control, function,
and location. More specific, some of the problems include:
1. different venders have different line control proce-
dures which make interconnection of different
machines by telecommunications very difficult;
2. incompatibility in the different network architec-
tures ;
3. software incompatibilities exist with different
vendors;
4. data base management systems are incompatibile; and
5. internetting is difficult.
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With the foundations established, the next chapter
provided an expanded discussion of ADP and data communica-
tions. First of all, the marriage of the two technologies
was presented as inevitable. The reasons (discussed in
chapter IV) for networks have become more justifiable,
largely because of the increasingly favorable price/
performance ratio cf hardware and user perceptions of
greater efficiency and effectiveness. Although evidence
(expert opinion) was presented in support of wide spread
acceptance of network technology, the authors 1 have reserva-
tions about the maturity of the technology. These reserva-
tions stem from the management issues outlined at the end of
the preceding paragraph. Irrespective of these, the key
point is that networking is becoming more important to
organizational entities of all sizes and is rapidly gaining
increased acceptance. It is getting bigger and bigger and
projections support continued growth.
To remove all doubt that data communications is a
management concern, aspects of costs were discussed in the
next section. With the understanding that data communica-
tions is not a "free good," the question becomes one of
determining just how much is expended on this resource. This
is an extremely difficult question to answer, particularly
with the union of telecommunications and data communica-
tions. The problem of ferreting out data communications from
telecommunications was illustrated by the FCC's decision to
abandon its efforts to classify various services and equip-
ment as either data or voice communications. The trend in
corporations has been to consolidate the two. This again
raises the question cf who should be responsible for the
overall iranagement of the two.
Within the the Navy, all communications support (whether
data communications or telecommunications) will fall under
the purview of a single organization, NAVTELCOM, as of
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October 1, 1984. Tc acquire support, in the area of data
communications, different procedures exist depending on
whether the request is for long haul data communicaticns or
local. In the long haul area, use of the DDN was mandated by
SECNAV in order to achieve the advantages of having a
national data network. DDN system waivers are approved only
if the requester can prove that the DDN cannot meet the
user's requirement. The TSfi is the vehicle for acquiring
communications support.
The next chapter focused on key management issues
leading to the analysis and recommendations portion of this
thesis. Basically, the issues revolve around organizational
needs and how to keep pace with the continuously changing
technology. The ideal vehicle for dealing with new tech-
nology seems to be the use of a Technology Team in concert
with an information systems steering committee or board.
Within the Navy this steering commitee should be atove the
NAREAC/NAVDAC level in order to ensure that the overall
organizational needs are met. The Technology Team can be
placed organizationally under the steering committee, under
the NAVEAC banner, or under the NAVTELCOM organization.
Irrespective of where the team is located organizationally,
there is a real need for its implementation. This, in short,
is the essential element needed for both ADP and data commu-
nication managers to meet the challenges of the future.
B. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the future holds many challenges for
ADP/data communicaticns managers. The key to success will be
the lessons learned from the past and the ability of these
managers to use these lessons to better plan ahead yet
remain flexible in the face of rapid changes in technology.
NAVDAC, as the ADP expert, and NAVTELCOM, as the communica-




1. ADP - Automatic Data Processing.
2. ADPE - Automatic Data Processing Equipment.
3. AES - Automated Data System.
4. AIS - Automated Information System
5. ATST - American Telephone and Telegraph.
6. AUTODIN - Automatic Digital Network of the Defense
Communications System (DCS) for record communica-
tions.
7. CNO - Chief of Naval Operations.
8. CCMNAVDAC - Commander, Naval Data Automation Command.
9. CCMNAVFACENGCOM - Commander, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command.
10. CCMNAVTELCOM - Commander, Naval Telecommunications
Command.
11. DCA - Defense Communications Agency.
12. DCS - Defense Communications System.
13. DOD - Department of Defense.
14. DCN - Department of the Navy.
15. DP - Data Processing
16. GAO - Government Accounting Office
17. LCM - Life Cycle Management.
18. MEP - Marginal Physical Productivity
19. NACDAC - Naval Data Automation Command.
20. NALDA - Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis System
21. NCS - National Communications System.
22. NIF - Navy Industrial Fund
23. 05M - Operations and Maintenance.
24. CMB - Office cf Management and Budget.
25. OPNAV - Naval Operations
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26. EMS - Resource Management System
27. SECDEF - Secretary of Defense.
28. SECNAV - Secretary of the Navy.
29. TEC - Total Productivity Curve
30. TSR - Telecommunications Service Request,
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